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1.  Introduction 
 Forecasts of GDP growth, inflation and other macroeconomic variables play an important 
role in the economy because they influence the investment and production decisions of firms and 
policy actions of central banks and other policy-makers.  The success of firms and the ability of 
policy-makers to promote economic stability and long-term growth are determined by their 
access to accurate macroforecasts. 
 Unfortunately, studies have consistently found that economists do a poor job forecasting 
macroeconomic variables (Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993; Schuh, 
2001; Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner & Zha, 2003).  This is especially true around business cycle 
turning points and other periods of significant economic change.  For example, Schuh (2001) has 
shown that all participants in the Survey of Professional Forecasts persistently under-predicted 
GDP growth in the United States four years in a row between 1996 and 1999.  Similarly, all 
members of the Blue Chip panel of macroforecasters over predicted economic growth during the 
Great Recession. 
 While the performance of individual forecasters has been poor, it has been shown in a 
number of studies that there is a “wisdom of the crowd” in this field.  That is, the mean forecast 
across all forecasters, referred to as the “consensus forecast,” is more accurate than most 
individual forecasts (Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993; Bauer, 
Eisenbeis, Waggoner & Zha, 2003).  For example, Bauer et al. (2003) find: 
The Blue Chip Consensus Forecast consistently performs better than any of the individual 
forecasters do. This result is a ‘reverse Lake Wobegon’ effect: none of the forecasters are 
better than the average forecaster…There are superior forecasters, but no individual has 
access to all of the independent information from all of the forecasts that is incorporated 
into the consensus forecast.  (p. 27) 
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Other researchers theorize that the consensus forecast has superior accuracy due to the diversity 
of individual estimation procedures and information used by macroforecasters to predict 
macroeconomic variables (Page, 2004; Bates & Granger, 1969).   
 One explanation for the poor performance of individual macroeconomic forecasters is 
that it is extremely difficult to produce accurate forecasts given the complexity of the 
macroeconomic system and the inherent difficulty of predicting “shocks” which, by their very 
nature, are unpredictable.  An alternative explanation is that forecasters do not operate in a 
vacuum and that interaction between them and additional motivations – beyond simple 
maximization of accuracy – contribute to their poor track record.  For instance, Lamont (2002) 
argues that the presence of principal-agent problems can cause forecasters to use their forecasts 
to manipulate beliefs about their ability.  According to this view, forecasters sell their services 
(forecasts) in monopolistically competitive markets where there is relatively free entry and exit 
and potential for product differentiation.  Moreover, the consumers in these markets (firms and 
governments purchasing the forecasts, the “principals”) have imperfect information about the 
quality of the forecasts (the “agents”).  Given this market structure, it may be in the forecasters’ 
best interests to deliberately deviate from other forecasters to garner positive publicity for their 
product.  Alternatively, forecasters may mimic the forecasts of others (herd to the pack) in an 
attempt to build a reputation as a consistently accurate forecaster among competitors (Laster, 
Bennett & Geoum, 1999).   
 Previous studies have examined cross-sectional variation in herding and deviating 
behavior.  For instance Laster et al. (1999) show that independent forecasters deviate more from 
other forecasters than non-independent forecasters (e.g., those affiliated with banks, industrial 
firms, etc.) and conclude that the independent forecasters herd less because they place a greater 
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value on publicity.  Lamont (2002) provides evidence that more experienced forecasters herd less 
than inexperienced ones and argues that this phenomenon illustrates forecasters’ recognition of 
their true ability as they gain more experience.  Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002) find that 
forecasters place a significant weight on the previous period consensus forecast when updating 
their individual forecast.   
 In contrast to previous studies which focus on cross-sectional variation in forecasters’ 
propensity to herd, this thesis examines variations in herding behavior over time.  I provide two 
unique theories of herding behavior over time and test each.  The first, which I refer to as the 
Mud on Your Face Theory, contends that forecasters choose their herding behavior based on 
their recent individual performance.  Using Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect Theory (1979; 
1992), the theory predicts that forecasters herd less following large personal forecast errors 
because they have suffered a loss to their reputation, become risk seeking and choose the riskier 
strategy of deviating from other forecasters.  Conversely, after forecasters forecast accurately, 
they achieve reputational gains and become risk averse, and consequently decide to herd more. 
Alternatively, the second theory, which I refer to as the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, 
suggests that herding behavior is driven by the recent performance of the consensus forecast.  
This theory predicts that forecasters are more likely to herd to the consensus forecast if the 
consensus has been accurate, and deviate from the consensus if it has been inaccurate. 
 I first address the previous macroforecasting and herding literature.  I then provide two 
theories that may explain changes in aggregate herding behavior over time.  Next, I summarize 
the data I use to evaluate these theories.  Then I present the empirical model I use to measure 
aggregate herding behavior and test my two theoretical models.  I conclude by analyzing the 
empirical results. 
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2.  Previous Literature 
2.1.  Macroforecasting 
 Macroforecasters aim to accurately predict macroeconomic variables such as GDP 
growth, unemployment rates and interest rates.  This information is used across many industries 
to make business decisions regarding output, employment and investment as well as to guide 
government policy.   
Initially, researchers who studied the forecasting industry assumed that macroforecasters’ 
incentive structures only rewarded forecasting accuracy.  That is, that they simply attempted to 
minimize their mean forecast error.  However, in the 1990s, researchers began to recognize other 
factors that influence forecasts, collectively named “rational bias.” For example, researchers 
have found that forecasters attempted to generate publicity for their firm to gain new clients by 
differentiating their forecast from others (Batchelor & Dua, 1990; Lamont, 2002). 
 The wide demand for macroforecasting services has spurred the creation of numerous 
forecasting firms.  These forecasters are either directly employed by the consumer of their 
forecasts (e.g., firms that forecast exclusively for specific banks, industrial organizations or 
governments) or they are employed by a variety of consumers (e.g. independent forecasting 
firms).  The forecasting methods of these firms vary considerably, with some using formal 
econometric models and others using less formal subjective methods.  As an added performance 
incentive, several publications that report survey panels of forecasts also provide a winner-take-
all award to the most accurate forecaster.1   
Individually, macroforecasters have struggled to accurately predict macroeconomic 
indicators.  Although they are able to perform with relatively high success during periods of 
                                                
1 These awards are generally given to a forecaster who is consistently accurate.  For example, the Lawrence R. Klein 
award is given to the forecaster that has the smallest errors when forecasting real GDP growth, CPI inflation, the 
unemployment rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators over a four-year 
period.  
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consistent, predictable growth, they often struggle to identify turning points, such as transitions 
from expansions to recessions (peaks) and vice versa (troughs).   
2.2 The Benefits of Herding to Other Forecasters 
 A large portion of the macroforecasting literature has addressed herding, in which 
forecasters choose to incorporate the previous forecasts of other forecasters into their updated 
forecasts rather than relying exclusively on their private information.  There are several benefits 
of herding to other forecasters.  Two benefits have been discussed at length in the literature: 
taking advantage of the hard-won information of others (information-based herding) and 
avoiding reputational losses due to deviating from the forecasts of others while incurring large 
errors (reputation-based herding).   
Information-based herding occurs when decision makers herd to take advantage of 
others’ information (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer & Welch, 1992; 1998).  In Bikchandani et al.’s 
theoretical model, they assume a set of sequential decision-makers that make binary affirmative 
or negative decisions.  These individuals make their respective decisions one after the other, 
basing their choices on their private signals as well as the decisions of the previous individuals.  
However, the decision-makers can only see the actions of the individuals before them 
(observable actions) but cannot see their signals (unobservable signals).  Additionally, none of 
the individuals know the precision of their private signal or the precision of the private signals of 
others. 
The first mover only acts based on the information in his private signal because he does 
not know the precision of his private signal.  Depending on his unobservable signal, the second 
mover then has the choice to either follow or deviate from the first mover.  Specifically, if the 
first mover’s observable action aligned with the second mover’s unobservable signal, the second 
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mover would always choose the same decision as the first mover.  If the first mover’s observable 
action differed from the second mover’s unobservable signal, however, the second mover would 
be indifferent between following the first mover or following his private signal.  Based on their 
model, Bikhchandani et al. contend that the third individual would likely follow the first two 
actors if they chose the same option regardless of his private signal.  If the first two actors chose 
different options, however, he would be in the same position as the first mover and would move 
based on his private signal.  The authors define the case in which one individual and all 
subsequent individuals follow the observable actions of the previous actors and ignore their 
private signals as an “informational cascade.”  Once the cascade begins and individuals stop 
acting based on their private signals, the aggregation of private information in the decisions 
stops.  If they follow the correct signal and all subsequent actors make the right choice, it is 
deemed a positive cascade; if not, it is a negative cascade.   
 Although their theory does not directly relate to forecasting, Bikhchandani et al. (1998) 
tie the model into the general case of observing the summary statistic of individuals who have 
already acted, similar to macroforecasting.  They theorize that as long as the perceived precision 
of the previous signals exceeds the decision-maker’s perception of the precision of his private 
signal, the decision-maker will herd to the behavior of individuals before him.  This situation 
strongly resembles the case of macroforecasting, in which macroforecasters have the ability to 
judge the recent success of their peers by comparing their peers’ recent forecasts to the actual 
values of the variable being forecasted.  However, Bikhchandani et al.’s model deviates from the 
case of macroforecasting.  Most notably, their model only allows for actors to make a binary 
decision of herding or non-herding on a binary task.  In macroforecasting, forecasters have the 
option to choose the degree to which they herd, if at all.    
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 An alternative form of herding, reputation-based herding, occurs when individuals herd 
to avoid falling far outside the group, rather than herding to take advantage of others’ 
information (Bikhchandani et al., 1998; Scharfstein & Stein, 1990).  Bikhchandani et al.’s (1998) 
theory is similar to that in Asch’s (1952) experiment, in which individuals knowingly answered a 
question incorrectly for the sake of avoiding stigma due to deviating from the responses of 
confederates in the experiment.2  In the terms of their informational cascade framework, 
Bikhchandani et al. (1998) claim that individuals that act to avoid stigmatization are likely to 
continue a negative cascade, even if their private signal precisely indicates otherwise.   
 Scharfstein and Stein (1990) add reputational considerations to the implied objective 
function of decision-makers in Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch’s (1998) model.  In 
Scharfstein and Stein’s principal-agent model, investors are either “smart” due to their highly 
informative signals that are highly correlated with market outcomes, or they are “dumb” and 
receive uninformative, noisy signals.  Scharfstein and Stein propose a “bright minds think alike” 
assumption, suggesting that the “smart” forecasters will forecast in a tight pack around their 
highly informative signals, and “dumb” forecasters will be randomly dispersed around the pack 
of “smart” forecasters.  Consequently, because neither the investors nor their clients know their 
true ability and signal precision, the market’s perception of an investor’s ability is based on the 
degree of similarity between an investor’s choices and other investors’ decisions.  
In a framework of sequential decision-making similar to Bikhchandani et al. (1998), 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) argue that individuals are very likely to mimic the decisions of 
                                                
2 Asch (1952) studied group conformity.  In his experiment, subjects entered a room full of confederates, whom they 
were told were other participants.  Each of the confederates and the subject were asked to identify the relative 
lengths of lines presented by the experimenter.  Prior to the subject providing his or her opinion, all of the 
confederates misidentified the relative lengths of the lines.  When it was the subject’s turn, they frequently gave the 
same erroneous response as the confederates.  Asch attributed this result to the subject’s need to conform to the 
group; although he knew the correct answer, he gave an incorrect answer to be similar to the other group members. 
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other investors for fear of exposing themselves as incompetent by predicting values that are far 
from the group average.  This type of reputation-based herding is also applicable to 
macroforecasting, in which forecasters potentially have a high propensity to herd to the 
consensus forecast in order to guarantee that, even if they are incorrect, they are wrong with the 
other members of the group rather than being wrong alone. 
 Lamont (2002) empirically tested Scharfstein and Stein’s (1990) theory of reputation-
based herding among macroforecasters.  Lamont examines two components that influence 
herding behavior over macroforecasters’ life cycles.  First, Lamont proposes the “tight-priors” 
effect, which postulates that as a forecaster’s experience increases, that forecaster’s ability 
becomes apparent and he is not able to deceive clients of his ability by following the herd.  
Consequently, the theory predicts that forecasters herd less over their life cycles.  Lamont also 
considers the “far-to-fall” effect, in which a forecaster’s incentive to herd rises over his life cycle 
due to the greater potential losses from deviating from the crowd later in the forecaster’s career 
after he has achieved a strong reputation.  Using annual macroforecasting data from Business 
Week, Lamont finds that forecasters’ deviations from the consensus increase over their life cycle, 
providing support for the tight-priors effect over the far-to-fall effect.3   
 Additional research has addressed other cross-sectional characteristics of 
macroforecasters’ herding behavior.  Ferderer, Pandey and Velatsianos (2005) built upon 
Lamont’s (2002) work by comparing empirical evidence for information-based and reputation-
based herding among macroforecasters using macroforecast data from the Blue Chip Economic 
Indicators data for real gross domestic product (GNP) growth, CPI inflation, the unemployment 
                                                
3 Lamont (2002) provided additional support for this finding based on the comparative performance of human 
forecasters compared to econometric modelers.  Specifically, he hypothesized that the theories would only apply to 
human forecasters whose forecasts are affected by reputational concerns, and that econometric modelers’ forecasts 
would not follow the same patterns due to their objective forecasting methods.  As expected, he finds that the tight-
priors effect holds only for human forecasters, and not econometric modelers. 
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rate and short-term interest rates.  After dividing the forecasters into winners and non-winners of 
the Lawrence R. Klein Blue Chip Forecasting award, Ferderer et al. (2005) found support for 
information-based herding.  Specifically, they find that forecasters who win the award are 
generally less likely to herd, showcasing the perceived strength of their private signal.  When 
they do herd, they are much more successful at efficiently incorporating information only from 
other winners.  Alternatively, they find that non-winners herd more over their life cycles as they 
recognize the additional signal accuracy included in others’ forecasts compared to their private 
signals.  These non-winners are also less efficient when herding and herd to a larger group of less 
accurate forecasters than to the forecasts of winners. 
2.3 The Benefits of Deviating from Other Forecasters 
Forecasters also benefit from deviating from the predictions of other forecasters.  
Consider the market structure of forecasters as monopolistically competitive: the services 
provided by forecasters are highly differentiated, there is free exit and entry into the market, 
there are many consumers and forecasters in the market, and forecasters have some control over 
the price of their services.  Consequently, forecasters are incentivized to differentiate their 
product by offering the lone best product to maximize the price they can charge for their 
services.  Batchelor and Dua (1990) conducted one of the seminal studies on forecast 
differentiation and found that a select group of forecasters consistently provided overly 
optimistic or pessimistic forecasts over the sample period and concluded that this strategy of 
providing extreme forecasts was used to differentiate their product.  Subsequent research has 
evaluated how forecasters’ decisions to herd and deviate from other forecasters vary across 
different types of forecasters based on the incentive structure that comprises each forecaster’s 
unique reward function (Laster et al., 1999). 
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Macroforecasters are incentivized to both maximize their individual accuracy and 
generate positive publicity for their firm (Batchelor & Dua, 1990; Hong, Page & Riolo, 2011; 
Laster et al., 1999).4  In most cases, forecasters are influenced by both incentives and choose 
their herding behavior as a combination of the two, based on the preferences of their clients. 
“Profit maximisation by forecasters may involve sacrificing some accuracy in the interests of 
producing a distinctive product.  So it may be optimal for forecasters to publish technically 
irrational forecasts in a commercial forecasting environment” (Batchelor and Dua, 1990). 
 In the first incentive structure, forecasters are compensated based only on their individual 
accuracy of predicting an economic indicator.  If they predict correctly, regardless of how the 
other forecasters perform, they will receive a high payoff.  This compensation framework is 
likely to dominate among institutional forecasters, such as banks or manufacturing firms, in 
which the forecasters already have their clients and are forecasting for internal purposes.  
 In contrast, forecasters are also rewarded based on their performance relative to the rest 
of the group and the consequent publicity they generate for their firm.  If they predict correctly, 
their compensation is inversely related to the number of other forecasters who also predict 
correctly (i.e. compensation is highest when a forecaster is correct alone and lower when he and 
many other forecasters are all correct).  Consequently, this incentive structure rewards 
forecasters for deviating from the group and can cause them to forgo potential accuracy for the 
potential positive publicity achieved by being correct and different from all other forecasters.  
This compensation framework is more likely to dominate the objective functions of aspiring 
forecasters who are looking for new clients and therefore are trying to differentiate themselves 
                                                
4 Hong et al. (2011) refer to the incentive structure that rewards individual accuracy as “individual-based incentives” 
and the incentive structure that rewards generating publicity for one’s firm as “market-based incentives”.  I exclude 
this terminology to simplify my analysis of these incentive structures. 
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from the herd by generating publicity for their services (Batchelor & Dua, 1990; Hong et al., 
2011; Laster, Bennett and Geoum, 1999).   
 It is important to note that an individual forecaster’s utility function generally includes 
incentives that reward his individual accuracy, as well as incentives that reward him for 
generating positive publicity for his firm, based on his personal preferences as well as the 
preferences of his clients.  Consequently, forecasters attempt to maximize their utility (wages) 
subject to the constraints of their market structure.  Laster et al. (1999) studied systematic 
differences between the market structures of different types of forecasters that arise from the 
demands of their clients. 
Laster et al. empirically examined the relative importance of accuracy-driven and 
publicity-driven incentives for different types of forecasters.  Specifically, Laster et al. employ a 
framework in which a forecaster’s wage is determined by his accuracy and by the publicity he 
generates for his firm by differentiating his product from his competitors.  In Laster et al.’s 
model, the users of forecasts are divided into two groups: “intensive” users that consistently 
follow forecasts to guide business decisions, and “occasional” users that only use forecasts 
periodically.  Laster et al. theorize that intensive users likely monitor a set group of forecasts 
each period.  Consequently, forecasters that cater to these users are more incentivized to produce 
consistently accurate forecasts than to generate publicity for their product.  Alternatively, 
occasional users tend to choose a forecaster based on his recent performance.  Consequently, 
forecasters that cater to occasional users are incentivized to deviate from other forecasters to 
differentiate their product while also attempting to maximize accuracy, but to a lesser degree 
than forecasters that already serve intensive users. 
Freedman 13 
In their paper, Laster et al. (1999) analyze the cross sectional differences in herding 
behavior of different types of forecasters.  One group, which consists of banks, econometric 
modelers, industrial firms and security firms, caters to “intensive users” of forecasts.  
Alternatively, independent forecasters target “occasional users” of forecasts.  Therefore, the 
utility function of the first group, which caters to intensive users, consists of a compensation 
structure that rewards these forecasters for their consistent individual accuracy more than 
generating publicity for their firm, as their customers are more interested in their consistent 
success than occasionally being the most accurate forecaster.  In contrast, the second group, 
which consists of independent forecasters, is rewarded more for generating publicity for their 
firm than being consistently accurate.  This strategy is used by independent forecasters to 
differentiate themselves from their competitors to gain new “occasional” users.  These 
independent forecasters may gain publicity from time to time by choosing to deviate from the 
consensus, and thus will be less accurate on average.  However, independent forecasters are 
willing to accept long-term inaccuracy to periodically gain occasional users.  Laster et al.’s 
(1999) results support their theory, indicating that independent forecasters deviate most from the 
consensus forecast. 
2.4 The Value of the Consensus Forecast 
2.4.1 Accuracy of the Consensus 
After extensive research into the performance of individual forecasters, studies shifted 
their focus to the performance of the consensus forecast, a simple average of all the individual 
forecasts.  Researchers hypothesized that the consensus forecast would be more accurate than 
individual forecasts because it aggregates the diverse estimation procedures of all the individuals 
included in the consensus.  Consequently, they predicted that individual forecasters’ estimation 
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biases would cancel to reveal the true value of the indicator in the consensus.  Studies using the 
Blue Chip Economic Indicators consistently find evidence of the “wisdom of crowds” in 
macroforecasting, in which the ‘crowd’ (the consensus forecast) consistently if not always 
outperforms the best individual forecaster (Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & 
Braun, 1993; Bauer, Eisenbeis, Waggoner & Zha, 2003).5  Additionally, recent studies of 
herding have found that when macroforecasters choose to herd, they generally herd to the 
consensus forecast (Ferderer et al., 2005). 
2.4.2 The Value of Diversity6 
Researchers theorize that the consensus forecast outperforms individual forecasts due to 
the cognitive (and consequently, model specification) diversity of forecasters.  For instance, Page 
(2007) shows that group success is based on two factors: individual ability and the components 
of individual diversity (perspective, interpretation, heuristic and predictive model diversity). 7  
Assuming that a sample is drawn from a large group of smart and diverse individuals that are 
working on a difficult task, his theory predicts that a group of randomly selected decision-makers 
will generally outperform a group of the best-performing individuals on problem-solving tasks.  
Based on this theory, he argues that the diversity of a group drives the group’s performance as 
much as their individual abilities.   
                                                
5 For a review of the consensus forecasting literature, see Clemen (1989). It is important to note that, although 
individual performance varies significantly from period to period, in the long run there are high-performance and 
low-performance individual forecasters (Schuh, 2001). 
6 Although the core of diversity literature presented in this paper is drawn from Page’s (2007) book, the importance 
of diversity and the wisdom of crowds has been addressed widely the in statistics and economics literature.  One of 
the first studies was conducted by Galton (1907), in which he calculated the consensus estimate of the weight of a 
steer at a county fair in England.  More recently, Bates and Granger (1969) advocated for ideological diversity in 
forecasts to maximize the collective value of a consensus forecast.  For a complete review of the wisdom of crowds 
literature, see Surowiecki (2004). 
7 He claims that each individual has unique approaches to characterizing situations and challenges (perspective 
diversity), organizing their perspectives (interpretation diversity), developing resolutions to problems (heuristic 
diversity) and modeling cause and effect (predictive model diversity).   
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 Page and Hong (2004) empirically test this theory using computer-generated actors that 
have constant perspectives but different individual abilities and problem-solving heuristics.  
After testing each individual for baseline performance on a task in which the individuals were 
programmed to find the maximum value of a random value function, they assembled teams of 10 
and 20 from two pools: top-performers and randomly selected agents.  These teams worked 
together by using their heuristics to maximize a local value, such that after the previous actor 
could not find a higher value, the next individual would take over.  Eventually, when all the 
agents became stuck on the same point, the exercise would stop.  Page and Hong found that, on 
the whole, teams of randomly selected actors had considerably more heuristic diversity than 
teams of top performers and on average performed better than the teams of top performers. 
 One of the conclusions Page draws from this result is that the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts: collectively, a diverse group can do more than what all the individual group 
members could do separately.  For example, if one individual possesses one approach to a unique 
problem and another person has a different approach, individually they may not be able to solve 
a more complicated problem.  However, if they work together and combine their problem 
solving techniques (heuristics), they are more likely to be able to solve the problem.  Page 
explains this outcome using an analogy of a toolbox: although all the individual tools in a 
toolbox may only be able to accomplish simple tasks such as hammering a nail or screwing a 
screw, together, through their collective abilities, they are able to accomplish much greater tasks 
such as building a tree house (Page, 2007). 
 Page applies these findings to the predictive ability of teams, and concludes that as a 
crowd’s diversity increases, the error of the crowd’s consensus forecast decreases.  He bases this 
finding on what he terms the “Diversity Prediction Theorem”: 
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           !! (!! − !!,!)!!!!! = !! [!! !!,! − !!,!)! − !! [!! (!!,! − !!)!]!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!          (1) 
Collective Error = Average Individual Error – Prediction Diversity 
The theorem states that the average consensus squared error (!! (!!!! !! − !!)!: average squared 
deviations of the consensus forecast (!!)  from the actual (y!,!) outcome for periods 1 through N) 
equals the average individual squared error (!! [!! y!,!-­‐y!,!)!!!!!!!!! : average squared 
difference between forecaster i through !’s forecasts (!!,!) and the actual forecasts (!!,!) for 
periods 1 through N) minus the prediction diversity (!! [!! (!!,! − !!)!]!!!!!!!! : average squared 
differences between forecaster i through !’s forecasts (!!,!) and the consensus forecasts (!!) for 
periods 1 through N).  Using this theorem, he extends his previous conclusions to predictive 
tasks, finding that diversity is of equal importance to individual ability.  In these cases, he 
highlights the “Projection Property”: when various people base their predictive models on 
different variables and they have the same perception of the problem they are solving, the 
correctness of their predictions will generally be negatively correlated, and they will cancel each 
others’ errors.  As diversity in the group grows, these benefits become multiplicative due to the 
coverage of additional variables and the development of interactive effects in the consensus.  In 
terms of macroforecasting, Page’s framework explains the relative success of the consensus 
forecast compared to all individual forecasters.   
 Herding presents a significant challenge to Page’s theory of the benefits of diversity. 
Herding diminishes the cognitive diversity of a crowd because some proportion of the group 
ignores their private information and their personal models of interpreting those signals.  Page 
(2007) recognizes the negative impact of herding on diversity, and consequently theorizes that to 
maximize cognitive diversity, individuals should not be able to see others’ actions.  This may not 
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be possible in real-life environments in which forecasters have the ability to herd by 
incorporating the consensus forecast from the previous period into their current-period forecast.   
2.5 Addition to Literature 
 Previous studies of macroforecaster herding have focused on differences across 
forecasters that affect their propensity to herd.  The findings presented in this literature are very 
important and necessary to control for when conducting empirical tests.  However, in this study I 
evaluate a group of forecasters’ average propensity to herd over time.  I attempt to explain 
systematic variations in forecasters’ herding behavior over time based on factors such as 
business cycles and the accuracy of the consensus forecast.    
3.  Theory 
 As outlined above, macroeconomic forecasters are motivated by two primary 
considerations: accuracy and publicity.  Forecasters aim to be close to the actual value of the 
variable they are predicting.  However, their efforts to be accurate are mitigated by their desire to 
receive publicity, which rewards them for being the lone correct forecaster.  This motivates them 
to differentiate their product from those of their competitors.  Each month, forecasters learn the 
predictions of other forecasters from the previous month through publications such as the Blue 
Chip Macroeconomic Indicators.  After receiving this information, forecasters then choose the 
degree to which they incorporate the consensus forecast from the previous period into their 
revised forecast based on their incentive structure and the public information available to them. 
 In this section I outline two theories that can explain fluctuations in macroforecasters’ 
herding behavior over time.  The first, which I refer to as the Mud on Your Face theory, uses 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 1992) to predict how forecasters’ recent 
individual accuracy influences their herding behavior.  This theory predicts that, during periods 
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in which forecasters are performing well (e.g., stable moderate expansionary stages of the 
business cycle when there are few adverse shocks) and are experiencing reputational gains, they 
will choose to herd more.  However, during periods in which their individual accuracy decreases 
(e.g., recessionary periods following a large negative shock or significant expansionary periods 
following large positive shocks) and they are experiencing reputational losses, the theory 
predicts that forecasters will choose to deviate more from the consensus.  The key factor driving 
this result is that forecasters’ risk preferences are determined by whether they are operating in 
the domain of reputational gains or losses: during periods of reputational gains, forecasters are 
risk averse which causes them to herd more.  Alternatively, during periods of reputational losses, 
forecasters are risk taking which causes them to herd less. 
 A second theory, The Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, utilizes the recent 
accuracy of the consensus forecast to predict macroforecasters’ herding decisions and is based on 
information-based herding theory.  The theory predicts that if the consensus forecast has been 
accurate recently, forecasters will perceive that it contains valuable information and will choose 
to herd more to increase the accuracy of their forecasts.  Alternatively, if the consensus forecast 
has been inaccurate, forecasters will choose not to decrease their herding behavior because they 
perceive that the consensus does not contain valuable information.  
3.1.  Mud on Your Face Theory 
 One potential explanation of changes in herding behavior over time is how forecasters 
respond to variations within the business cycle.  Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) find that the 
variance of macroforecasts increases significantly following large negative or positive stochastic 
shocks that force the macroeconomy into recession or rapid expansion, respectively.  Zarnowitz 
and Lambros theorize that this phenomenon occurs due to increased macroeconomic uncertainty 
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during these periods.  Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979; 1992) Prospect Theory provides a 
potential alternative explanation for this outcome.   
3.1.1.  Prospect Theory 
 Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1992) address agent decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty.  They contest that actors begin at a reference point, having achieved either gains or 
losses, which determines their current utility.  Their future utility is determined by their relative 
gains or losses to wealth or reputation from their current position.8  Kahneman and Tversky 
derive this behavior from the incorporation of dynamic risk preferences into actors’ decision-
making processes based on their changes to states of wealth (see Figure 1).  They theorize that 
when an individual’s reference point is positive and they have been achieving gains (on the 
positive side of the x-axis; for example, Point A), they are risk averse due to the concavity of 
their utility function.  Due to the concavity of their utility function during these periods of gains, 
Prospect Theory predicts that the disutility of a loss significantly exceeds the utility gains of a 
comparable gain.  Alternatively, when they are in the loss domain (on the negative side of the x-
axis; for example, Point B), they are risk averse due to the convexity of their utility function.  
Consequently, due to the convexity of their utility function during periods of losses, the utility of 
a gain significantly exceeds the disutility of a comparable loss. 9  
For example, consider a bettor’s betting behavior at the end of the day at the racetrack.  
By the end of the day, most bettors are in the loss territory due to the racetrack’s advantage.  
                                                
8 Alternatively, expected-utility theory predicts that individuals will rationally evaluate the probability of each 
outcome and make a decision on how to act based on their expected outcome regardless of their reference point: 
Expected Value = Prob (x1)*Expected Value (x1) + Prob (x2)*Expected Value (x2) … Prob (xn)*Expected Value 
(xn).  Expected-utility theory predicts that a decision maker’s final utility is determined by his final position on his 
value function, as opposed to his change in position on the value function. 
9 The other key finding of Prospect Theory is that individuals will overestimate the likelihood of unlikely outcomes 
and underestimate the likelihood of likely outcomes.  For example, for low likelihood events, individuals are keen 
on making long shot bets and purchasing insurance, even though the possibility of winning the lottery or using the 
insurance is very low.  However, individuals generally overweight the difference in likelihoods for highly probable 
versus certain events. 
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Consequently, bettors attempt to return to gains territory by making bigger bets on long shot 
horses, similar to publicity seeking forecasters driven by publicity-rewarding incentives.  
Camerer (1998, pg. 7) contends, “These bettors really prefer longshots because a small longshot 
bet can generate a large enough profit to cover their earlier losses, enabling them to break even.”  
This result illustrates the dominance of prospect theory in human behavior, in that the bettor is 
willing to forgo probable additional losses to generate the small possibility that his long shot bet 
will result in a large payoff.   
3.1.2.  Application to Macroforecasters 
 Prior theoretical models of forecaster behavior assume risk neutrality (Scharfstein & 
Stein, 1990; Laster, Bennett & Geoum, 1999).  Consequently, to predict the implications of 
Prospect Theory for macroforecaster herding, we must theorize the implications of dynamic risk 
preferences on herding behavior.   
 Previous empirical studies find that forecasters consistently perform better during periods 
of stable and predictable economic activity, in which large macroeconomic shocks do not occur 
(Schuh, 2001; Zarnowitz, 1984; Zarnowitz, 1992; Zarnowitz & Braun, 1993).  Lamont’s far-to-
fall effect may explain why forecasters herd more during these periods: “As a forecasters’ wages 
and reputation rise over time, his reputation becomes a more valuable asset to be protected…and 
herding increases” (1995).  Although Lamont’s theory is designed to explain behavior over the 
career of a macroeconomic forecaster, it provides useful insight into the short-run decisions of 
individual macroforecasters as their reputation varies over the business cycle.  During periods of 
reputational gains, forecasters are likely risk averse and herd to avoid reputational losses from 
inaccurate forecasts.  Because their reputation is already high and the utility over gains is 
concave, the additional utility generated from an even better reputation is small.  If they herd and 
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predict incorrectly, they will not be incorrect alone and suffer from a significant loss of 
reputation.  Prospect Theory’s predicted risk aversion strengthens Lamont’s far-to-fall effect, 
which is hypothesized under risk neutrality.10 
 For example, consider Figure 2.  This provides an example of a forecaster’s position on 
his value function (y-axis) after a period of sustained, steady, low-shock growth, in which he is 
in gains territory at point X (x-axis).  He faces a decision, to herd more or less.  If he herds more, 
he reduces his range of possible reputational levels for the next period.  On the one hand, 
increased herding reduces his potential to stand out and experience a large gain in reputation.  On 
the other hand, increased herding protects him from a large drop in reputation by being wrong 
alone.  I assume that by herding, he has a .5 probability of either experiencing small gains or 
small losses from either becoming more or less accurate (range A-A’), yielding an expected 
value slightly below his current value (Expected Value Herding).  If he herds less, however, he 
faces a wider range of potential outcomes (assuming .5 probability of gains or losses, range B-
B’), yielding an expected value further below his current value, and below his expected value if 
they were to herd (Expected Value Deviation).  Due to the dynamic nature of his risk 
preferences, his perceived potential losses are significantly greater than his perceived potential 
gains of deviating from the consensus forecast, which results in herding behavior. 
 Alternatively, during periods following large unpredictable macroeconomic shocks, 
forecasters will perform worse and face reputational losses.  Here, herding protects him against 
further losses in reputation but his potential changes in utility are small.  On the other hand, by 
herding less the forecaster increases the possibility of receiving positive publicity, which 
                                                
10 Lamont also addresses a competing theory, called the “tight priors effect,” in which a forecaster’s ability to herd 
decreases throughout their career decreases as their clients become more aware of their actual ability.  Similarly to 
the far-to-fall effect, the tight priors effect is based on the progression of a forecaster’s herding behavior over the 
career.  However, there it is not applicable to the current case because I do not address the perception of a 
forecaster’s ability over his career. 
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increases his reputation and, due to the convexity of his utility function, provides him with large 
positive marginal utility. For example, consider Figure 3.  After a large macroeconomic shock, a 
forecaster is in loss territory at point X (x-axis).  Similar to the forecaster in gains territory in the 
previous example, he also can choose to either herd or deviate from the lagged consensus.  If he 
herds, he can reduce the uncertainty of his utility in the next period by likely remaining near his 
current position, assuming a .5 probability of experiencing small gains or small losses (range A-
A’).  This option yields an expected value slightly above his current value (Expected Value 
Herding).  If he deviates from the lagged consensus, however, his expected value (Expected 
Value Deviation) is significantly higher than both his current value and his expected value if he 
were to herd.  This is due to the wider range of potential outcomes and the convexity of his 
utility function (assuming .5 probability of gains or losses, range B-B’).  In this case, the 
forecaster faces disincentives to herd because the perceived potential gains of deviating from the 
consensus forecast outweigh the potential losses in the individual forecaster’s value function. 
 The Mud on Your Face Theory predicts that when a forecaster is performing well and 
experiencing reputational gains, he will herd more.  However, following poor performance and 
consequent reputational losses, he will herd less.  The two key assumptions that generate this 
prediction are that (1) increased herding reduces the range of possible changes to reputation and 
(2) there is a concave relationship between utility and reputation in the domain of gains and a 
convex one in the domain of losses. 
3.2.  The Transitory Wisdom of Crowds 
 An alternative theory of macroforecaster herding behavior contends that macroforecasters 
choose their herding behavior based on the accuracy of the consensus forecast over the past 
several periods.  For example, consider a multi-period model (shown in Figures 4a and 4b).  In    
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t = 0, individuals are in information isolation and are unable to herd to the consensus.  In terms 
of macroforecasters, this isolation occurs when they have no information about their peers’ 
forecasts, likely at the beginning of a new forecasting horizon.  Consequently, they rely on their 
private signals, which maximize the information diversity included in the consensus.  Page 
(2007) theorizes that this high level of diversity should maximize the accuracy of the consensus 
forecast.  In t =1, forecasters can observe the consensus forecast and recognize that it was more 
accurate than their individual forecasts. Therefore, they choose to incorporate the lagged 
consensus into their forecast revision to encompass the additional information included in it.  
This diminishes the diversity and accuracy of the consensus forecast but increasing the accuracy 
of their individual forecasts.   In period t = 2, forecasters begin to recognize the diminishing 
accuracy of the consensus and realize that their independent forecasts may be more accurate due 
to the lack of diverse information contained in the consensus.  Consequently, they diminish the 
weight they place on the lagged consensus in their current period forecast.  In period t = 3, as the 
forecasters decrease the weight they place on the consensus, the diversity of information 
included in and accuracy of the consensus begins to rise again, and once it exceeds the accuracy 
of most forecasters, they will begin herding again, resulting in a cyclical pattern (See Figures 4a 
and 4b).  Due to the frequent updates published, the forecasters cannot sufficiently judge the 
accuracy of the consensus from period to period.  Consequently, herding behavior would 
continue to fluctuate and not converge to an equilibrium value. 
3.3.  Summary of Theoretical Predictions 
 The Mud on Your Face theory and the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds 
provide identical hypotheses regarding herding behavior during periods in which recent 
individual and consensus forecasts have been accurate or inaccurate.  During periods in which 
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the individual’s forecast and the consensus forecast have both been accurate, both models predict 
that forecasters are motivated to engage in herding behavior and place a high weight on the 
lagged consensus forecast when revising their forecast.  Alternatively, during periods in which 
both the individual’s forecast and the consensus forecast have been inaccurate, both theories 
predict that the individual will deviate from the lagged consensus forecast.   
 However, during periods in which the accuracy of the individual’s forecast and the 
consensus forecast have differed, the theories make different predictions.  When the individual’s 
forecast has been accurate and the consensus forecast has been inaccurate, the Mud on Your Face 
theory predicts that the forecaster will herd more and the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds theory 
predicts that the forecaster will deviate from the consensus.  When the individual’s forecast has 
been inaccurate and the consensus forecast has been accurate, the Mud on Your Face theory 
predicts that the forecaster will herd less and the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds theory predicts 
that the forecaster will herd more.  These predictions are summarized in Table I. 
4.  Data / Summary Statistics 
4.1 Conceptual Model 
 To evaluate the predicted theories, we aim to measure the components of the average 
forecaster’s herding behavior.  Herding in macroforecasting occurs when a forecaster is revising 
his forecast and instead of only using his previous period forecast and new information about the 
state of the macroeconomy, he also places some weight on the consensus forecast from the 
previous period.  In this thesis, I aim to estimate the average weight forecasters place on the 
lagged consensus when making their current period forecast, what factors contribute to their 
decision, and what other information they use when updating their forecast.  The Mud on Your 
Face theory suggests that the propensity to herd is inversely related to the forecaster’s recent 
forecast error.  The Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds proposes they choose based on 
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the recent accuracy of the consensus forecast.11  
4.2.  Ideal Data 
 The ideal macroforecasting data for this analysis would cover a long period that includes 
several business cycles.  The data would include a balanced set of macroforecasters, all of who 
would have forecasted in every period.  Each of the forecasters would employ the same 
forecasting staff across time to limit intra-forecaster firm heterogeneity.  Additionally, the 
distribution of forecasters within the sample would be constant across affiliations (e.g. 
independent, industry, bank; see Laster et al., 1997).   
 Ideally, the data would also include information regarding what information each 
forecaster includes in their model, why they choose their sources of information, and how they 
choose the relative weight for each source of information.  For example, if forecasters revealed 
how confident they were in their previous period forecast, to what degree they decided to herd in 
their current forecast and why they chose to herd, and other new information acquired during the 
period they incorporated into their model, I would be able to make much more accurate and 
precise evaluations of the theories.  
4.3.  Actual Data 
 Unfortunately, the data available are not ideal; however, they are sufficient for this 
analysis.  The forecasting data come from the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter (Moore, 
2008), which reports monthly forecasts for real gross national product (GNP) growth, 
unemployment rate, inflation rate and other indicators.  In this analysis, I evaluate the GNP and 
                                                
11 Due to the use of panel data, this analysis includes data from many forecasters across time.  This yields a 
conceptual model in which the forecast of each forecaster at each point in time is based on the consensus forecast 
from the previous period, interacted with the individual forecaster’s and consensus’ recent performance to measure 
the relative importance of each component, as well as other information such as the forecaster’s previous period 
forecast and additional news acquired over the period. 
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unemployment rate forecasts. 12  These provide an interesting combination as GNP data is 
released quarterly and revised for several years, whereas unemployment data is updated monthly 
without revision.  The forecasts are collected from forecasters during the first three days of each 
month and reported later in the month in the newsletter.  Each month, beginning in January, 
forecasters are asked to predict the macroeconomic variables for the current year and next year.13  
Each month the forecasters are asked to revise their forecasts from the previous month until their 
final forecast for the current year and next year are made in December. 
 The dataset spans from January 1984 to December 200814 and includes forecasts from 120 
forecasters.15  The number of forecasters varies across the sample (Mean monthly sample size = 
51.1, Standard Deviation = 1.8).  Several forecasters enter the publication only for a short period 
or provide sporadic forecasts.  To control for any potential bias that may arise from differentials 
in experience or frequent exit and entry into the sample, I created a subsample of the original 
dataset that only includes the 25 forecasters that forecasted at least 60% of the full sample period 
(Mean = 22.8, Standard Deviation = 2.1).16  I refer to this subsample as the “veterans”.  
Forecasters include econometric modelers, independent forecasters, and those employed by 
banks, industrial corporations, securities firms and other agents.17  Due to the frequent entry and 
                                                
12 In the data, the forecasters forecast GNP from 1984-1991, and real gross domestic product (GDP) from 1992-
2008.  Although the measure changes, I refer to the variable as “GNP” for simplicity’s sake. 
13 In this analysis I only focus on current-year forecasts.  It would be interesting to evaluate the next-year forecasts 
to determine how the results change. 
14 Due to the specification of the empirical model, specifically the need to include forecasters’ errors over the 
previous year and forecasts from the previous month, the first year and first month of every year for every forecaster 
are excluded from the statistical analysis, but are drawn upon when the model is evaluated.  Consequently, the actual 
number of forecasters included in the analysis is 113. 
15 For additional information about the forecasters in the sample, please see Appendix I. 
16 Figure 5 graphically depicts the number of forecasters in the “veterans” subsample and total sample.  Previous 
studies of herding behavior also focus on a similar subsample (Gallo et al., 2002).  It is especially important to make 
this distinction when using the Blue Chip dataset as forecasters must consistently forecast to be eligible for the 
accuracy award.  Consequently, forecasters that do not forecast consistently inherently have a different incentive 
structure than those that forecast in every period. 
17 These distinctions are based on the groupings made by Laster et al. (1999).  “Other” agents include organizations 
such as government agencies and insurance firms. 
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exit of individual forecasters in the complete sample, the distribution of forecasters within these 
categories changes substantially from period to period (see Table II).   
 The actual GNP and GDP data used to analyze individual and consensus accuracy was 
collected from the first available estimates of the annual rates published in the “Economic Report 
of the President” and the “Survey of Current Business.”  These data sources are a theoretically 
and empirically precise measure of evaluating how the forecasters evaluated their accuracy as 
well as the accuracy of the consensus forecast, because the data used are “real-time,” meaning 
they are the initial estimates of economic growth available to forecasters when making their 
forecasts (Croushore & Stark, 2001). 
 The actual unemployment rate data were acquired from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(2012).  Real-time data were not acquired, as there are few revisions to unemployment reports. 
 Prior to using regression analysis to evaluate herding behavior, it is useful to examine the 
fundamental characteristics of the data.  First, consider Figures 6 and 7, which depict the 
veterans and entire sample’s consensus forecast versus the actual values of GNP growth and 
unemployment rates.  After looking at Figure 6, it is easy to see that macroforecasters’ forecast 
errors are larger during periods of recession and rapid expansion, such as the recession of the 
early 1990s and early 2000s when forecasters under predicted the depth of the recession. These 
results support the findings of previous empirical work (e.g. Zarnowitz, 1984, 1992; Schuh, 
2001), which find that forecasters’ errors are lower during periods when GNP growth is near its 
long-term trend rate (2-3%) versus high errors during periods of recession.  It is also interesting 
to note that in Figure 7 forecasters’ errors do not follow as significant a pattern for 
unemployment forecasts.  Rather, it appears that forecasts of unemployment face a short lag 
behind the actual value of unemployment regardless of the point in the business cycle.  It also 
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appears that forecasters’ errors when forecasting GNP exceed their errors when forecasting 
unemployment, especially around turning points.  Also, Figures 6 and 7 confirm that the 
forecasts of the entire sample of forecasters and the subsample of veterans were quite similar.   
 Figures 8-11 illustrate the dispersion of forecasts made in June and December versus the 
actual rate of GNP growth.  These figures provide a deeper exploration into forecasters’ errors 
across the business cycle by showing the dispersion of forecasts instead of solely the consensus.  
Figures 8 and 10 especially illustrate forecasters’ significant errors during recessionary and 
especially large expansionary periods versus periods of relatively stable growth.  For example, 
consider years 1996 to 1999 in Figure 10.  During this economic boom, forecasters’ June 
forecasts were consistently below the actual economic growth rate.  Also consider the recession 
of 2008; Figure 10 clearly depicts forecasters’ overestimates of economic growth during this 
recessionary period in which their optimism led to erroneous forecasts.  Alternatively, consider 
the beginning of the great moderation from approximately 1985 to 1991.  During this period of 
relatively stable and low economic growth, forecasters’ estimates of economic growth were 
much closer to the actual outcomes. 
Also, Figures 8-11 illustrate the clustering effect of forecasts throughout the year.  
Specifically, by comparing the range of forecasts made in June versus December, it is easy to see 
that the forecasts generally converge to one another later in the year.  This clustering occurs due 
to the incorporation of additional information throughout the year as forecasters gain more 
insight into actual annual GNP growth. 
5.  Empirical Model 
 My empirical model aims to measure patterns in macroforecasters’ herding behavior 
across time as a function of each forecaster’s individual accuracy (Mud on Your Face) and the 
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accuracy of the consensus forecast (Transitory Wisdom of Crowds).18  Using a random effects 
regression to analyze the unbalanced panel of macroeconomic forecasts, I test for the effects 
predicted by the two theories across time while controlling for individual variation across 
forecasters.19   
5.1.  Gallo et al. (2002) Model 
The empirical model is adapted from Gallo et al. (2002), which was used to measure individual 
forecasters’ propensity to herd: 
                                      y!,!! =  ∝   +!!!!!,!!!! + !!!!!,!!! + !!!!!,!!!! + !!,!!                                    (2) 
 
In their model, the dependent variable, !!,!! , represents forecaster i’s forecast that is j periods 
from the target period in the current year t.  The first term on the right side, y!,!!!! , represents 
forecaster i's forecast in the previous period (one additional period from the target period: j+1).  
The second term, y!,!!!! , represents the consensus forecast from the previous period.20  The third 
term, σ!,!!!! , represents the group variance from the previous period.21 
 The first coefficient,  β!! , represents the weight that forecaster i places on their previous 
period forecast when updating their current period forecast.  The closer this value is to 1, the 
more persistent the forecaster’s previous period forecast is in the current period forecast.  The 
second coefficient,  β!! , represents the weight forecaster i places on the lagged consensus forecast 
when revising their current period forecast, thereby measuring a given forecaster’s propensity to 
                                                
18 Herding behavior is also confirmed using tests of Granger Causality.  For more information, please see Appendix 
II. 
19 Please see Appendix III for a rationale of the model estimation method. 
20 The consensus forecast (the group’s average forecast) is functionally defined as: y!,!=!! !!!!!!!! , where the 
consensus forecast,  ! at time t for N forecasters is equal to the summation of each forecaster i's forecast at time t, 
divided by the number of forecasters at time t. 
21 The group’s variance is functionally defined as: σ!,!! = !!-­‐! (y!!-­‐y! )!!!!! . 
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herd.  Increases in !!!  represent increases in forecasters’ propensity to herd.  The final 
coefficient,  !!! , measures how the dispersion of individual forecasts change as the forecasting 
horizon decreases and approaches the target period.  The classical error term, ε!,!! , accounts for 
any other information forecasters include in their revised forecasts from sources other than the 
lagged consensus or forecast dispersion.  For example, if good news about the macroeconomy is 
released during the forecasting period, the error term will be greater than zero indicating an 
upward revision in forecasts not accounted for by the individual’s previous forecast or the 
previous consensus forecast. 
 Gallo et al. (2002) evaluated herding behavior using an unbalanced panel of current-year 
and future-year GNP growth forecasts from Consensus Forecasts.  Their data included monthly 
forecasts from 1993-1996 for U.S. GNP growth (17 forecasters, 1279 sample points), Japanese 
GNP growth (10 companies, 752 sample points), and U.K. GNP growth (31 companies; 2429 
sample points).  Similarly to my current analysis, Gallo et al. only used forecasts from “veteran” 
forecasters that forecasted at least 61% of the sample to avoid problems arising from irregular 
participation in the survey.  Gallo et al. estimated (2) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and 
then pooled the results.  Their results for forecasts of U.S. GDP growth are (t-statistics are in 
parentheses under coefficient estimates, adjusted R2 = .79): 
                        !!,!! = 0.38(8.36)+ 0.85(47.86)!!,!!!! + 0.04(3.36)!!,!!!! − 0.20(−3.74)!!,!!!!                       (3) 
These results indicate, that on average, the persistence of a forecaster’s forecast from the 
previous period to the current period is high, with a weight of 0.85 put on the lagged individual 
forecast.  Additionally, the forecasters updated their forecast by putting a weight of 0.04 on the 
lagged consensus forecast from the previous period.  The final term indicates that as forecasters 
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approach the target period, the variance of individual forecasts around the consensus forecast 
decreases 20% each period leading to the final period of the forecasting horizon. 
5.2.  Baseline Specification of Empirical Model 
 In my empirical analysis, I first replicate Gallo et al.’s (2002) model using a slightly 
different specification:  
                                                        y!! = α+ β!y!-­‐!! + β!y!-­‐! + ε!                                       (4) 
There are two main differences between my baseline model (4) and Gallo et al.’s (2002) model 
(2).  First, I estimate my model using random effects.22  Second, I exclude the spread term from 
Gallo et al.’s (2002) model because it does not provide value in this analysis.23  Also, instead of 
using Gallo et al.’s j+1 notation of the current period, I use t to represent the current period in 
models (4) and (5).  Otherwise, the dependent variable y! , β!, β! , and   ε!  have the same 
interpretation as Gallo et al.’s (2002) empirical model.  
5.3.  Complete Empirical Model 
 The complete empirical model used in this analysis alters the Gallo et al. (2002) model 
(2) and my baseline model (4) to examine the theories presented in this paper:  
                                                          !!! = ! + !!!!!!,!! + !!!!!!,! +                                        (5) !! !! !!,!!!! − !!,!!! !!!!! +   !! !!" [(!!,!!!!"!!! −!!,!!!)!]+      !! !!!!× !! !!,!!!! − !!,!!! !!!!! + !! !!!!× !!" [(!!,!!!!"!!! −!!,!!!)!] + !!!  
                                                
22 Due to the use of panel data in this analysis, there was significant serial correlation present in the model estimates.  
This serial correlation was corrected by including select lagged values of the dependent variable as independent 
variables in the model.  Tables IV through IX, which provide detailed estimates of specifications (4) and (5), 
elaborate on which lags were used when evaluating each specification.  Due to the unbalanced nature of the dataset 
and forecasters’ frequent entry and exit from the sample over the year, this correction significantly decreased the 
number of observations in the dataset.  For additional information, see the Results section. 
23 The fourth term of the Gallo et al. (2002) model (σ!,!!!! ) estimates the spread of forecasts in a sample.  I have 
chosen to omit this term because it is unrelated to the question at hand.  This removal eliminates the need for the j in 
the subscript, as I are uninterested the number of periods to the target period.  Other studies, such as Pons-Novell 
(2004), that employ a similar model to evaluate herding behavior, exclude this term as well. 
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The dependent variable y!, β!, β!, and ε! have the same interpretation as the baseline model (4).  
The only change is the addition of !  to indicate that these are values for the current year.  The 
current model adds four additional terms to test the theories proposed above.  The third term, 
!! !!,!!!! − !!,!!! !!!!! , measures the average individual squared error for forecaster i over 
the previous year, ! − 1 (forecasted value in month t, !!! minus the actual value  !!) for the  ω 
months the individual forecasted over the previous year, ! − 1 (i.e., if it were any month in year !, the measure of individual errors would include the average squared errors of the individual 
forecaster over the previous calendar year, January to December of year ! − 1) for the i 
forecasters that forecasted in that period.  Similarly, the fourth term,   !!" [(!!,!!!!"!!! −!!,!!!)!], 
measures the consensus squared error over the previous year.  Because there is a consensus 
forecast for each month, instead of a forecaster entering and exiting the sample over the year, ω 
is changed to 12 from the previous term.  The fifth term, !!!!× !! !!,!!!! − !!,!!! !!!!! , is 
an interaction of the second term (lagged consensus) with the third term (average individual 
errors over the previous year).  The sixth term, y!-­‐!× !!" [(y!,!-­‐!!"!!! -­‐y!,!-­‐!)!] , is an interaction 
of the second term (lagged consensus) with the fourth term (average consensus errors over the 
previous year). 
 The coefficients of β! and β! are necessary to evaluate the Mud on Your Face and the 
Transitory Wisdom of Crowds theories.  By interacting the weight each forecaster places on the 
lagged consensus with both their recent individual accuracy and the recent accuracy of the 
consensus forecast, these terms measure the relationship between forecasters’ propensity to herd 
and their forecasting performance versus the forecasting performance of the consensus.  The 
coefficient on the fifth term, β!, measures the interaction between a forecaster’s propensity to 
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herd and his accuracy over the previous calendar year.  If the coefficient β! is positive, it 
indicates that as an individual’s errors from the previous year increase, his propensity to herd 
increases.  This term is used to test the Mud on Your Face theory, which predicts that herding 
behavior is motivated by individual performance.  The Mud on Your Face theory predicts β! will 
be negative, indicating that as each forecaster’s inaccuracy increases, their herding behavior will 
decrease.  Recall that this relationship is expected because greater individual errors lead to 
reputational losses, forecasters falling into the loss domain and becoming risk taking 
 The coefficient on the sixth term,  β!, estimates the interaction between forecasters’ 
propensity to herd and the accuracy of the consensus forecast over the previous year.  If the 
coefficient β! is positive, it indicates that as consensus errors increase, herding also increases.  
This term is used to evaluate the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, which predicts 
that the propensity to herd is a negative function of consensus forecast accuracy, and 
consequently predicts the coefficient will be negative.   
 The coefficient on the third term,  β!, represents the average impact of each individual 
forecaster’s accuracy over the previous calendar year on their current period forecast.  If 
coefficient  β! is positive, it indicates that as an individual’s errors over the previous year 
increase, that individual’s forecast over the current year increases.  The coefficient on the fourth 
term,  β!, has the same interpretation, however it is based on the recent accuracy of the consensus 
forecast.  Based on the findings of Zarnowitz (1984, 1992) and Schuh (2001), I expect that 
forecasters’ errors will be highest during recessionary periods following unexpected adverse 
economic shocks.24  Consequently, the expected signs on both of these terms for the GNP 
estimations are positive because forecasters will likely predict a economic recovery following 
                                                
24 Although there are also extreme positive shocks leading to opposite error patterns, these periods are rare and 
generally shorter than the periods of recession.  Consequently, I expect the anticipated relationship to prevail. 
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recessions, assuming the recessions in the sample last on average one year or less.  However, the 
expected signs for the unemployment estimations are negative, due to decreases in 
unemployment following recessions. 
6.  Results 
6.1  Serial Correlation 
The presence of serial correlation significantly affected the estimations of specifications 
(4) and (5).  Models (4) and (5) include a fixed correction for first-order serial correlation: 
forecaster i's previous period forecast.  After thorough analysis of the data, it became apparent 
that each of the four datasets (entire sample vs. veterans; GNP vs. unemployment) had more 
complex structures of serial correlation.  To correct for potential bias arising from serial 
correlation, I included lags of the dependent variable as explanatory variables when estimating 
(4) and (5).25  To achieve uniformity in my estimates, I also estimated the veterans subsample of 
each dataset using the correction for serial correlation germane to the entire sample and I 
estimated the entire sample of each dataset using the correction for serial correlation derived 
from the veterans subsample.   
Table III provides an overview of all estimations of specification (5) for veterans’ and the 
entire samples’ forecasts of GNP growth and unemployment rates using a baseline correction for 
first-order serial correlation (first, third, fifth and seventh columns) as well as a sample-specific 
correction for serial correlation (second, fourth, sixth and eighth columns).26  Table IV includes 
detailed estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’ and veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth 
                                                
25 When estimating the unique structure of serial correlation for each dataset, I began by estimating (4) and (5) with 
11 lags, the greatest theoretical number of periods an individual’s forecast could persist.  I then eliminated the lags, 
one by one, starting with the oldest lag.  When I reached a lag with a significant z-score (p-value < .05), I left that 
lag in the estimation and continued eliminating insignificant lags until all remaining lags were significant. 
26 The final row of Tables III, IV, V, VI, VII, VII and IX include which lags of the dependent variable were used to 
correct for serial correlation.   
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using the naïve correction for first-order serial correlation.  Tables V and VI provide detailed 
estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’ and veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth using 
serial correlation corrections determined from the entire sample and the veterans subsample, 
respectively. Table VII includes detailed estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’ and 
veterans’ forecasts of unemployment rates using the naïve correction for first-order serial 
correlation.  Tables VIII and IX provide detailed estimates of (4) and (5) for the entire samples’ 
and veterans’ forecasts of unemployment rates using serial correlation corrections determined 
from the entire sample and the veterans subsample, respectively. 
Section 6.2 includes results from the naïve estimation of (4) and (5) with corrections for 
only first-order serial correlation.  Section 6.3 includes results from (4) and (5) using sample-
specific corrections for serial correlation. 
6.2  Results Corrected for First-Order Serial Correlation 
 Subsections 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 include the regression results for all four datasets 
using naïve corrections for only first-order serial correlation. 
6.2.1 Entire Sample GNP 
The results of the baseline specification (4) for the entire sample’s forecast of GNP are 
presented in Table IV.  The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates 
that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they placed a 0.7873 weight 
on their previous period forecast.  The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus 
forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they 
placed a 0.2208 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd 
to the consensus.  As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are significant, indicating a 
strong persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant 
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herding to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions.  Additionally, the summation of the two 
coefficients, 1.0081, is extremely close to 1, indicating that the entire current period forecast is 
on average a combination of weights placed on the individual’s previous period forecast and the 
lagged consensus forecast.   
 Table IV also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for the entire 
sample.  The results provide support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds but not 
for the Mud on Your Face Theory, indicating that all forecasters considered the recent accuracy 
of the consensus forecast when choosing their herding parameter.  The coefficient on the fifth 
term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is 
negative as expected but the z-score is not statistically significant.  The coefficient on this term,  
-0.002, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus 
squared errors, as a forecaster’s average squared errors over the previous year increased by one 
percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his 
current period forecast decreased by 0.002 from the initial weight placed on the lagged 
consensus forecast given by the second coefficient, 0.2502.  For example, if a forecaster’s 
squared errors over the previous year increased by 1%, his weight on the lagged consensus 
(propensity to herd) would decrease from 0.2502 to 0.2522.  Clearly, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is not economically significant because the coefficient is less than 1% of the baseline 
propensity to herd.  Although the sign on this coefficient is negative as expected, this result does 
not provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory because the z-score of the coefficient is 
not statistically significant and the magnitude of the coefficient is not economically significant. 
 However, the coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between recent consensus 
squared errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is negative as expected and the z-score is 
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statistically significant, which provides support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of 
Crowds.  The coefficient on this term, -.0755, indicates that after controlling for an interaction 
between herding and recent individual squared errors, as the squared errors of the consensus 
from the previous year increase by one percent, the average weight a forecaster placed on the 
lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast decreased by 0.0755.  For 
example, if the squared errors of the consensus over the previous year increased by 1%, a 
forecaster’s weight on the lagged consensus (propensity to herd) would decrease from 0.2502 to 
0.1747.  This result supports the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, which predicts 
that as the recent errors of the consensus increase, forecasters’ propensity to herd decreases and 
they deviate from the lagged consensus.  
 The other terms in the model also provide useful information regarding forecaster 
behavior.  The first coefficient, (!!), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.7901 
weight on their previous period forecast when revising their forecast.  This weight is very similar 
to the estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.7873.  The third coefficient (!!), indicates that on 
average, as forecasters’ squared errors increased by 1% over the previous year, their current 
period forecasts were on average 0.0002% higher.  Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!!), 
indicates that as the squared errors of the consensus increased by one percent over the previous 
year, on average forecasters’ current period forecasts were on average 0.2351% higher.  As 
expected, the third and fourth coefficients are positive, indicating that following periods of high 
individual and consensus errors, likely due to an adverse economic shock, forecasters projected 
higher GNP growth rates as they predicted that the economy would recover from the shock. 27   
                                                
27 This explanation assumes that the recessions in the sample lasted on average less than one year.  The mean 
duration of the three recessions in the sample (July 1990-March 1991, March 2001-November 2001, December 
2007-December 2008 (end of sample); defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) was 9 and 1/3 
months (NBER, 2010). 
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6.2.2. Veterans GNP 
 The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth are 
presented in Table IV.  The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates 
that on average, when veterans revised their forecasts, they placed a 0.6413 weight on their 
previous period forecast.  The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, 
indicates that on average, when veterans revised their forecast, they placed a 0.374 weight on the 
lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus.  As 
expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are highly significant, indicating a strong persistence 
of an individuals’ forecasts from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the 
lagged consensus in forecast revisions.  Similarly to the GNP data for the entire sample, the 
summation of the two coefficients, 1.0153, is extremely close to 1.  It is interesting to note the 
difference in these estimates compared to the estimates of Gallo et al. (2002).  Recall that Gallo 
et al. found that forecasters placed a 0.85 weight on their previous period forecast and a 0.04 
weight on the lagged consensus when revising their forecast.  The current estimates indicate that 
forecasters placed a significantly smaller weight on their previous period forecast and a much 
greater weight on the lagged consensus forecast, displaying a significantly greater propensity to 
herd.  The difference in results may be attributable to differences in the sample period and the 
different source of forecasts. 
 Table IV also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5).  The results 
provide support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds but not for the Mud on 
Your Face Theory, indicating that veteran forecasters considered the recent accuracy of the 
consensus forecast when choosing their herding parameter.  Similarly to the entire sample, the 
coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the 
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lagged consensus (!!), is negative as expected but the z-score is not statistically significant.  The 
coefficient on this term, -0.0084, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between 
herding and recent consensus accuracy, as a veteran’s average squared errors over the previous 
year increased by one percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast 
when revising their current period forecast decreased by 0.0084 from the initial weight given by 
the second coefficient, 0.4186.  Similarly to the entire sample, it is clear that the coefficient is 
economically insignificant because it is only 2% of the initial herding parameter.  
 The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between the lagged consensus squared-
errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is negative and the z-score is statistically significant.  The 
coefficient on this term, -0.0736, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between 
herding and recent individual squared errors, as the average squared errors of the consensus over 
the previous year increased by one percent, the average weight a veteran placed on the lagged 
consensus forecast when revising their current period forecast decreased by 0.0736 from the 
initial weight given by the second coefficient, 0.4168.  This result provides support for the 
Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds, indicating that as the recent errors of the consensus 
increased, forecasters’ propensity to herd decreased. 
 The other terms in the model provide additional insight into macroforecaster behavior.  
The first coefficient, (!!), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.6407 weight on 
their previous period forecast when revising their forecast.  This weight is very similar to the 
estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.6413.  Additionally, the third coefficient (!!), indicates that 
for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the previous year, their 
current period forecast was on average 0.0206% higher.  Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!!), 
indicates that for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the 
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previous year, their current period forecast was on average 0.2197% higher.  As expected, the 
signs of the third and fourth coefficients are positive, indicating that following periods of high 
individual and consensus errors, forecasters forecasted higher GNP growth rates. 
6.2.3 Entire Sample Unemployment 
 The results of the baseline specification (4) for the entire samples’ forecasts of 
unemployment rates are presented in Table V.  The coefficient on the first term, the lagged 
individual forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of 
unemployment, they placed a 0.712 weight on their previous period forecast.  The coefficient on 
the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters 
revised their forecasts of unemployment, they placed a 0.2925 weight on the lagged consensus 
forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus.  As expected, the z-scores for 
these coefficients are highly significant, indicating a strong persistence of an individual’s 
forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in 
forecast revisions.  Additionally, as expected, the summation of the two coefficients, 1.0045, is 
extremely close to 1.   
 Table V also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5).  The results do not 
provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory and challenge the Theory of the Wisdom of 
Crowds.  The coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual squared 
errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is unexpectedly positive but the z-score is statistically 
insignificant.  The coefficient on this term, 0.0003, indicates that after controlling for an 
interaction between herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a forecaster’s average 
squared errors over the previous year increased by one percent, the weight that forecaster placed 
on the lagged consensus forecast in his current period forecast increased by 0.0003 from the 
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initial herding parameter, 0.2789.  It is clear, however, that the magnitude of the coefficient is 
economically insignificant as it is only .1% of the baseline herding parameter. 
 The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between lagged consensus squared 
errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is unexpectedly positive and the z-score is statistically 
significant, challenging the Theory of the Wisdom of Crowds.  The coefficient on this term, 
0.1447, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus 
squared errors, as a forecaster’s average squared errors over the previous year increase by one 
percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast in his current period 
forecast increased by 0.1447 from the initial herding parameter, 0.2789.  This unexpected result 
may be explained by the more frequent availability of information regarding unemployment rates 
versus GNP growth rates, which would allow forecasters to revise their perceptions of consensus 
accuracy more frequently.  Consequently, the one-year window used in this analysis to evaluate 
the recent accuracy of the consensus forecast may not accurately depict how forecasters judge 
the accuracy of the consensus for unemployment forecasts. 
 The coefficients for the lagged individual forecast and lagged consensus forecast are 
statistically significant and similar to the estimates in specification (4) (0.5439 and 0.4912, 
respectively).  The coefficient on the third term, recent individual squared error, -0.9197, is 
negative as expected and statistically significant, indicating that following periods of high 
individual and consensus errors, likely due to an adverse economic shock, forecasters projected 
lower unemployment rates as they predicted that the economy would recover from the shock. 
The coefficient of the fourth term, recent consensus squared errors (0.0003), is unexpectedly 
positive, however it is statistically and economically insignificant.  
6.2.4 Veterans Unemployment 
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 The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of unemployment are 
presented in Table V.  The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates 
that on average, when veterans revised their forecasts of the unemployment rate, they placed a 
0.7074 weight on their previous period forecast.  The coefficient on the second term, the lagged 
consensus forecast, indicates that on average, when veterans revised their forecast of the 
unemployment rate, they placed a 0.2947 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a 
significant tendency to herd to the consensus.  As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are 
significant, indicating a strong persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to the next, 
as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions.  Additionally, the 
summation of the two coefficients, 1.0021, is extremely close to 1, indicating that the current 
period forecast is a combination of weights placed on the individual’s previous period forecast 
and the lagged consensus forecast.28 
 Table V also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for veterans’ 
forecasts of unemployment rates.  The results do not provide support for either the Mud on Your 
Face Theory or the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.  The coefficient on the fifth 
term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is 
unexpectedly positive, however the z-score is statistically insignificant.  It is fair to assume that 
the small magnitude (0.0161) implies that this term is not economically significant and therefore 
it does not provide support for or challenge the Mud on Your Face Theory. 
 The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between lagged consensus squared 
errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is also unexpectedly positive, the z-score is not statistically 
                                                
28 These estimates cannot be compared to the results of Gallo et al. (2002), as Gallo’s model was only used for 
estimates of economic output and not other variables, such as unemployment. 
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significant and the magnitude is not economically significant.  Consequently, this result does not 
provide support for or challenge the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.   
 The only statistically significant coefficients in this specification are the first and second 
terms, lagged individual forecast (0.7082) and lagged consensus forecast (0.2923).  The 
similarity between these estimates and the equivalent naïve baseline estimates, in addition to the 
similar Wald !! and !! values of the models (356180.03 vs. 356231.54 and 0.9836 vs. 0.9836 
for the baseline and full specifications, respectively), indicate that the addition of the recent 
individual and consensus accuracy and interaction terms in this specification do not provide 
significant additional explanatory power.  Consequently, it is reasonable to dismiss the 
unexpected signs of the added terms.  
6.3  Results Corrected for Additional Degrees of Serial Correlation 
 Subsections 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 include the regression results for all four datasets 
using sample-specific corrections for serial correlation. 
6.3.1 Entire Sample GNP 
The results of the baseline specification (4) correcting for first, second, third and seventh 
order serial correlation for the entire sample’s forecast of GNP are presented in Table VI.  The 
coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates that on average, when all 
forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they placed a 0.8645 weight on their previous period 
forecast.  The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, indicates that on 
average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts of GNP, they placed a 0.1427 weight on the 
lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus.  As 
expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are significant, indicating a strong persistence of an 
individual’s forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged 
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consensus in forecast revisions.  Also, as expected, the summation of the two coefficients, 
1.0072, is extremely close to 1.  These estimates are very similar to the comparable estimates in 
the naïve model (0.7873 and 0.2208 for the first and second terms, respectively), which only 
corrects for first-order serial correlation. 
 Table VI also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for the entire 
sample correcting for first, third, sixth, ninth and tenth order serial correlation.  The results 
provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory but not the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom 
of Crowds, indicating that all forecasters considered their recent accuracy when choosing their 
herding parameter.  The coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual 
squared errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is negative as expected and the z-score is 
statistically significant.  The coefficient on this term, -0.0253, indicates that after controlling for 
an interaction between herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a forecaster’s average 
squared errors over the previous year increased by one percentage point, the weight that 
forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast 
decreased by 0.0253 from the initial herding parameter, 0.6671.  For example, if a forecaster’s 
squared errors over the previous year increased by 1%, his propensity to herd would decrease 
from 0.6671 to 0.6418.  Although the magnitude of this coefficient is somewhat small relative to 
the initial herding parameter, it is clear that forecasters’ propensity to herd decreased as their 
recent individual errors increased, providing support for the Mud on Your Face Theory.   
 The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between recent consensus squared errors 
and the lagged consensus (!!), is unexpectedly positive but the z-score is not statistically 
significant, which does not provide support for or challenge the Theory of the Transitory 
Wisdom of Crowds.  The coefficient of this term, 0.0143, indicates that after controlling for an 
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interaction between herding and recent individual squared errors, as the squared errors of the 
consensus over the previous year increased by one percent, the average weight a forecaster 
placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast increased by 
0.0143.  Although the sign of this coefficient contradicts the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of 
Crowds, I dismiss the incongruence due to the small magnitude of the coefficient (2.1% of the 
initial herding parameter) and statistical insignificance of the estimate. 
 The other terms in the model also provide useful information regarding forecaster 
behavior.  The first coefficient, (!!), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.3448 
weight on their previous period forecast when revising their forecast.  This weight is very 
different from the estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.8645, and is also quite different from the 
comparable coefficient in the model with the naïve corrections for serial correlation, 0.7901.  A 
possible explanation for this inconsistency is the use of a more complicated correction for serial 
correlation as well as the additional explanatory variables included in specification (5).  The third 
coefficient (!!), indicates that on average, as an individual forecaster’s squared errors increased 
by one percent over the previous year, their current period forecast was on average 0.0729% 
higher.  Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!!), indicates that as the squared errors of the 
consensus forecast increased by one percent over the previous year, on average forecasters’ 
current period forecasts were 0.0531% lower.  As expected, the third coefficient is positive, 
indicating that following periods of high individual errors, forecasters projected higher GNP 
growth.  However, the sign of the fourth coefficient is unexpectedly negative.  A possible 
explanation for this outcome is that individual forecast errors are more highly correlated with 
recessionary periods than consensus errors, and that fluctuations in consensus accuracy are 
driven by other factors, such as the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. 
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6.3.2. Veterans GNP 
 The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of GNP growth 
correcting for first, second, third, sixth, eighth and ninth order serial correlation are presented in 
Table VII. The coefficient of the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates that on 
average, when veterans revised their forecasts, they placed a 0.4585 weight on their previous 
period forecast.  The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, indicates that 
on average, when veterans revised their forecasts, they placed a 0.6151 weight on the lagged 
consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the consensus.  As expected, the z-
scores for these coefficients are highly significant, indicating a strong persistence of individuals’ 
forecasts from one period to the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in 
forecast revisions.  Similarly to the GNP data for the entire sample, the summation of the two 
coefficients, 1.0736, is very close to 1.  It is interesting to note the difference in these estimates 
compared to the estimates of Gallo et al. (2002).  Recall that Gallo et al. found that forecasters 
placed a 0.85 weight on their previous period forecast and a 0.04 weight on the lagged consensus 
when revising their forecast.  The current estimates indicate that forecasters place a significantly 
smaller weight on their previous forecast and a much greater weight on the lagged consensus, 
displaying a significantly greater propensity to herd.   
 Table VII also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) using corrections 
for first, third, sixth, eighth and ninth order serial correlation.  The results provide marginal 
support for the Mud on Your Face Theory but not for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of 
Crowds, indicating that veteran forecasters considered their recent accuracy when choosing their 
herding parameter.  Similarly to the entire sample, the coefficient on the fifth term, the 
interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is negative 
Freedman 47 
as expected and the z-score is statistically significant.  The coefficient on this term, -0.0210, 
indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus accuracy, 
as a veteran’s average squared errors over the previous year increased by one percent, the weight 
that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast when revising his current period forecast 
decreased by 0.0210 from the initial herding parameter, 0.6447.  It is important to note that even 
though the coefficient is statistically significant, the magnitude of the coefficient is quite small 
relative to the initial herding parameter, indicating that when forecasters’ errors increase, their 
propensity to herd only decreases marginally, which provides limited support for the Mud on 
Your Face Theory.  
 The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between the lagged consensus squared-
errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is unexpectedly positive but the z-score is statistically 
insignificant and the magnitude is economically insignificant.  The coefficient on this term, -
0.0047, indicates that after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent individual 
squared errors, as the average squared errors of the consensus over the previous year increased 
by one percent, the average weight a veteran placed on the lagged consensus forecast when 
revising his current period forecast decreased by 0.0047 from the initial herding parameter, 
0.6447.  Due to the economic and statistical insignificance of this result, it does not support or 
challenge the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds. 
 The other terms in the model provide additional insight into macroforecaster behavior.  
The first coefficient, (!!), indicates that on average, each forecaster placed a 0.4116 weight on 
their previous period forecast when revising their forecast.  This weight is very similar to the 
estimate in the baseline model (4), 0.4585.  Additionally, the third coefficient (!!), indicates that 
for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the previous year, their 
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current period forecast was on average 0.0660% higher.  Similarly, the fourth coefficient (!!), 
indicates that for every additional 1% of squared-errors in an individual’s forecast over the 
previous year, their current period forecast was on average 0.0210% lower.  As expected, the 
sign of the third coefficient is positive, indicating that following periods of high individual 
errors, forecasters forecasted higher GNP growth rates.  However, similarly to the entire sample, 
the sign on the fourth coefficient is unexpectedly negative. 
6.3.3 Entire Sample Unemployment 
 The results of the baseline specification (4) for the entire samples’ forecasts of 
unemployment rates correcting for first, fourth, seventh and ninth order serial correlation are 
presented in Table VIII.  The coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, 
indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecast of unemployment, they 
placed a 0.4588 weight on their previous period forecast.  The coefficient on the second term, the 
lagged consensus forecast, indicates that on average, when all forecasters revised their forecasts 
of unemployment, they placed a 0.5624 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a 
significant tendency to herd to the consensus.  As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are 
highly significant, indicating a strong persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to 
the next, as well as significant herding to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions.  Also, as 
expected, the summation of the two coefficients, 1.0212, is extremely close to 1.   
 Table VIII also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) corrected for 
first, second, third, fourth, sixth and ninth order serial correlation.  The results provide support 
for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds but not for the Mud on Your Face Theory.  
The coefficient on the fifth term, the interaction between lagged individual squared errors and 
the lagged consensus (!!), is negative as expected but the z-score is statistically insignificant and 
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the magnitude is economically insignificant.  The coefficient on this term, -0.0019, indicates that 
after controlling for an interaction between herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a 
forecaster’s average squared errors over the previous year increased by one percent, the weight 
that forecaster placed on the lagged consensus forecast in his current period forecast decreased 
by 0.0019 from the initial herding parameter, 0.6087.  However, it is clear that the magnitude of 
the coefficient is economically insignificant as it is only .3% of the baseline herding parameter. 
 The coefficient on the sixth term, the interaction between lagged consensus squared 
errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is negative as expected and the z-score is statistically 
significant, providing support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.  The 
coefficient on this term, -0.0852 indicates that after controlling for an interaction between 
herding and recent consensus squared errors, as a forecaster’s average squared errors over the 
previous year increased by one percent, the weight that forecaster placed on the lagged 
consensus forecast in their current period forecast decreased by 0.0852 from the initial herding 
parameter, 0.6087.  This result provides support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of 
Crowds, which predicts that forecasters’ propensity to herd will decrease as the recent errors of 
the consensus forecast increase. 
 The coefficients for the lagged individual forecast and lagged consensus forecast are 
statistically significant and similar to the estimates in specification (4) (0.3657 and 0.6087, 
respectively).  The coefficient on the third term, recent individual squared error (0.0044) is 
unexpectedly positive but statistically and economically insignificant.  The coefficient on the 
fourth term, recent consensus squared error (0.5246), is also unexpectedly positive, however it is 
statistically and economically significant. 
6.3.4 Veterans Unemployment 
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 The results of the baseline specification (4) for veterans’ forecasts of unemployment  
correcting for first, second and fourth order serial correlation are presented in Table IX.  The 
coefficient on the first term, the lagged individual forecast, indicates that on average, when 
veterans revised their forecasts of the unemployment rate, they placed a 0.5264 weight on their 
previous period forecast.  The coefficient on the second term, the lagged consensus forecast, 
indicates that on average, when veterans revised their forecast of unemployment, they placed a 
0.4759 weight on the lagged consensus forecast, showing a significant tendency to herd to the 
consensus.  As expected, the z-scores for these coefficients are significant, indicating a strong 
persistence of an individual’s forecast from one period to the next, as well as significant herding 
to the lagged consensus in forecast revisions.  Additionally, the summation of the two 
coefficients, 1.0023, is very close to 1. 
 Table IX also includes the results of the estimation of specification (5) for veterans’ 
forecasts of unemployment rates including corrections for first, second and fourth order serial 
correlation.  The results do not provide support for the Mud on Your Face Theory and challenge 
the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.  The coefficient of the fifth term, the 
interaction between lagged individual squared errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is 
unexpectedly positive, however the z-score is statistically insignificant.  It is fair to assume that 
the small magnitude (0.0054) implies that the term is economically insignificant, and therefore it 
does not provide support for or challenge the Mud on Your Face Theory. 
 The coefficient of the sixth term, 0.0339, the interaction between lagged consensus 
squared errors and the lagged consensus (!!), is unexpectedly positive and the z-score is 
statistically significant.  This result indicates that following large consensus errors, forecasters 
choose to herd more to the consensus, which challenges the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of 
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Crowds.  However, due to the relatively small magnitude of the coefficient, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the economic significance of this unexpected result is negligible and likely not 
attributable to forecasters’ perceptions of consensus accuracy. 
 The coefficients for the first and second terms, the lagged individual forecast (0.5252) 
and lagged consensus forecast (0.4745), are both statistically significant and very similar to the 
corresponding estimates in the baseline estimation (4). The coefficients for recent individual 
squared errors and recent consensus squared errors are both negative as expected but only the 
coefficient for the recent consensus squared error is statistically significant. 
7.  Conclusion 
Herding occurs in social environments when agents mimic others either to improve their 
own performance by utilizing the hard-fought information of other agents or to protect their 
reputation by running with the pack.  In the past most research on herding in economic settings 
has focused on explaining variations in herding behavior across agents.  For example, Lamont 
(2002) found that more experienced forecasters herd less than their less experienced counterparts 
because their clients already know their ability.  The goal of this thesis was to study variation in 
herding behavior over time rather than across agents.  
To do so I evaluated the propensity to herd over time of forecasters who participate in the 
survey conducted by the Blue Chip Economic Indicators newsletter from 1984-2008.  I 
developed two theories designed to explain changes in the propensity to herd over time.  The 
Mud on Your Face theory predicted that a forecasters’ propensity to herd is motivated by his or 
her recent success.  Using Prospect Theory, the Mud on Your Face theory predicts that large 
forecasting errors hurt a forecaster’s reputation and put them in the loss domain.  Consequently, 
they become risk-taking and have an incentive to deviate more from the consensus.   
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Alternatively, during periods of small individual errors, the theory predicts that forecasters 
experience risk aversion and a stronger incentive to herd.   The Transitory Wisdom of Crowds 
theory predicted that herding behavior is driven by the recent accuracy of the consensus forecast.  
Specifically, when the consensus forecast is accurate, forecasters are more likely to herd because 
they believe the consensus includes valuable private information and is therefore a better target 
to herd to, compared to periods of large consensus errors. 
The results are quite noteworthy and provide support for both theories.  The GNP 
forecasting data for both the veterans and the entire sample using the naïve correction for first-
order serial correlation provides strong support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of 
Crowds, which predicts that forecasters choose their herding behavior based on the recent 
accuracy of the consensus forecast.  Additionally, the GNP forecasting data for both the veterans 
and the entire sample corrected for complex forms of serial correlation provide strong support for 
the Mud on Your Face Theory, which predicts that forecasters choose their herding behavior 
based on their recent performance.   
Alternatively, the unemployment data provides no support for the Mud on Your Face 
Theory and limited support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.  Specifically, 
after correcting the entire samples’ forecasts of unemployment for high order serial correlation, 
the results provided support for the Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.  Conversely, 
when only correcting for first-order serial correlation in the entire sample and higher order serial 
correlation with the veteran subsample, I found unexpectedly significant results challenging the 
Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds.  However, after considering the magnitudes of the 
relevant coefficients, I concluded that the unexpected results were likely statistical artifacts and 
likely not economically relevant. 
Freedman 53 
These results provide probative value to consumers of macroeconomic forecasts, 
indicating that these consumers should be mindful of the consensus’ and individual forecasters’ 
recent forecasting accuracy when using their forecasts.  Although the results derived from GNP 
and unemployment forecasts are useful for considering herding behavior for other variables, the 
current results may not be generalizable to other variables.  One significant downside to the 
application of these results elsewhere is the different types, quality and availability of 
information available for other variables.  This problem is clear when comparing the results of 
the GNP forecasts and the unemployment forecasts; due to the differences between the variables, 
such as the release of actual values of the variables on different schedules and with varying 
revisions, support for both theories was apparent with the GNP data but neither theory held with 
the unemployment data. 
Additionally, it would be beneficial to derive more complete theoretical models of 
reputation-driven herding that generalize the assumption of risk neutrality made by Scharfstein 
and Stein’s (1990) to cases where agents are either risk-averse or risk-taking depending on 
whether they are operating in the domain of gains of loses. 
Overall, these findings suggest that macroforecasters’ propensity to herd varies over time 
and is systematically linked to past performance, both at the individual and group level.  These 
findings add to the existing literature which has focused almost exclusively on cross-sectional 
variation in herding behavior.  The finding that herding varies over time and is linked to past 
performance suggests that temporal variations in herding could play a role in business cycle 
dynamics.  In particular, past forecasting success of the consensus could lead to increased 
herding which ultimately causes the consensus to poorly aggregate private information and 
become a misleading indicator of future economic activity.  To the extent that the public relies 
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on the consensus to plan and make economic decisions, such inaccuracy could amplify macro 
shocks.    
 
  
Freedman 55 
References 
 
Asch, S. E. (1952). Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Bates, J. M., & Granger, C. W. (1969). The combination of forecasts. OR, 20(4), 451-468. 
Batchelor, R. A., & Dua, P. (1990). Product differentiation in the economic forecasting industry.  
International Journal of Forecasting, 6, 311-316. 
Bauer, A., Eisenbeis, R. A., Waggoner, D. F., & Zha, T. (2003). Forecast Evaluation with Cross-
Sectional Data: The Blue Chip Surveys. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic 
Review, 88(2), 17-32. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2012). National Unemployment Rate. Archives available at 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat01.htm. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1992). A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and 
Cultural Change as Informational Cascades. Journal of Political Economy, 100(5), 992-
1026. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1998). Learning from the Behavior of Others: 
Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
12(3), 151-170. 
Camerer, C. F. (1998). Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the field. Social Science 
Working Paper, California Institute of Technology, 1037. 
Clemen, R. (1989). Combining forecasts: A review and annotated bibliography.  International 
Journal of Forecasting, 5, 559-583. 
Croushore, D., & Stark, T. (2001). A Real-Time Data Set for Macroeconomists. Journal of 
Econometrics,105, 111-130. 
Economic Report of the President. (2012).  St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Economic Library 
and Archives. Archives available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publication/?pid=45. 
Ferderer, J. P., Pandey, B., & Veletsianos, G. (2005). Why do the Blue Chip Forecasters Herd? A 
Test of Information and Reputation Models.  Macalester College. 
Gallo, G. M., Granger, C. W. J., & Jeon, Y. (2002).  Copycats and common swings: The impact 
of the use of forecasts in information sets. IMF Staff Papers, 49(1), 4-21. 
Galton, F. (1907). Vox populi. Nature, 75, 450-451. 
Granger, C. W. J. (1969). Investigating causal relations by econometric models and cross-
spectral methods". Econometrica, 37(3), 424–438. 
Granger, C. W. J, & Bates, J. M. (1969). The Combination of Forecasts. Operational Research 
Society, 20(4), 451-468. 
Freedman 56 
Hong, L. & Page, S.E. (2004). Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of 
high-ability problem solvers. Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences, 101, 16385-
16389. 
Hong, L., Page, S. E., & Riolo, M. (2011).  Individual learning and collective intelligence.  Draft 
provided by Scott Page. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 263-292. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1992). Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative representation 
of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. 
Lamont, O. A. (2002). Macroeconomic Forecasts and Microeconomic Forecasters. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 48, 265-280. 
Laster, D., Bennett, P. & Geoum, I. S. (1999).  Rational bias in macroeconomic forecasts.  The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 293-318. 
Moore, R. E. (2008). Blue chip economic indicators. Aspen Publishers.  
NBER. (2010). US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions. Public Information Office, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Accessed from: 
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html 
 
Page, S. (2007). The Difference. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Pons-Novell, J. (2004). Behavioural biases among interest rate forecasters. Applied Economics 
Letters, 11,  319-321. 
Scharfstein, D. S. & Stein, J. C. (1990). Herd Behavior and Investment. The American Economic 
Review, 80(3), 465-479. 
Schuh, S. (2001). An Evaluation of Recent Macroeconomic Forecast Errors. New England 
Economic Review, Jan/Feb, 35-56. 
Surowiecki, J. The Wisdom of Crowds. New York, NY: Anchor Books. 
Survey of Current Business (2012). Bureau of Economic Analysis. Archives available at 
http://www.bea.gov/scb/date_guide.asp. 
Zarnowitz, V. (1984). The Accuracy of Individual and Group Forecasts from Business Outlook 
Surveys. Journal of Forecasting, 3(1), 11-26. 
Zarnowitz, V. (1992). The Accuracy of Individual and Group Forecasts. In V. Zarnowitz (Eds.), 
Business Cycles: Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting – University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, USA. 
 
Freedman 57 
Zarnowitz, V. & Braun, P. (1993). Twenty-two Years of the NBER-ASA Quarterly Economic 
Outlook Surveys: Aspects and Comparisons of Forecasting Performance.  In J. Stock & 
M. Watson (Eds.), Business Cycles, Indicators and Forecasting - University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, USA. 
Zarnowitz, V., & Lambros, L. A. (1987).  Consensus and uncertainty in economic prediction. 
Journal of Political Economy, 95, 591-621. 
  
Freedman 58 
Appendices 
Freedman 59 
Appendix I: Information About Forecasters in Sample 
For a quantitative breakdown of the composition of the forecasters in the sample, see Table II.   
Veterans: Bank of America Corp.; Bank One; USA Chamber of Commerce; Chase Manhattan 
Bank; Conference Board; Chrysler; DuPont; Econoclast; Eggert Economic Enterprises; Evans, 
Carrol and Associates; Georgia State; University of Maryland Inforum; La Salle National Bank; 
Macroeconomic Advisors, LLC; Merrill Lynch; Morgan Stanley & Co.; National City 
Corporation; North Trust Company; Prudential Financial; Prudential Equity Group; SOM 
Economics Inc.; Turning Point (Micrometrics); U.S. Trust Co.; UCLA Business Forecast; 
Wayne Hummer & Co. 
 
Entire Sample: 
Industrial Organizations: Caterpillar; USA Chamber of Commerce; Conference Board; Chrysler; 
Dun & Bradstreet; DuPont; Eaton Corporation; Fannie Mae; Fedex Corp.; Ford Motor Comp.; 
General Motors Corporation; Metropolitan Insurance; Motorola, Inc.; National Association of 
Home Builders; National Association of Realtors; Pennzoil Co.; Prudential Financial; Sears 
Roebuck; Swiss RE; W.R. Grace Co.; Weyerhaueser Co.; Mortgage Banker Association 
 
Banks: Bank of America Corp.; Bank One; Bankers Trust; Barnett Banks, Inc.; Brown Brothers 
Harriman; Chase Manhattan Bank; Chemical Bank; Citicorp Information Services; Comerica; 
CoreStates Financial Corp.; Credit Suisse; Harris Trust & Savings Bank; Huntington National 
Bank; Irving Trust Co.; JP Morgan Chase; La Salle National Bank; Marine Midland Bank; 
National City Corporation; Nations Bank; Northern Trust Co.; Fleet Financial Group; 
Philadelphia National Bank; PNC Financial Corp.; Security Pacific National Bank; U.S. Trust 
Co.; Wells Capital Management 
 
Securities Firms: Arnhold & S.Bleichroeder; Bear Stearns & Co., Inc.; BMO Capital Markets; 
C.J. Lawrence, Inc.; Chicago Corporation; CRT Government Securities; Daiwa Research of 
Institute Americas; Dean Witter Reynolds; Deutsche Banc Alex Brown; Goldman Sachs & Co.; 
J.W. Coons Advisors; Lehman Brothers; Morgan Guaranty; Morgan Stanley & Co.; Nomura 
Securities; Prudential Equity Group; Schwab Washington Research Group; UBS; Wachovia 
Securities; Chicago Capital, Inc.; Mesirow Financials; RBS Greenwich Capital 
Econometric Modelers: DRI-WEFA; Fairmodel Economica Inc.; Georgia State; University of 
Maryland Inforum; Macroeconomic Advisors, LLC; Merrill Lynch; UCLA Business Forecast; 
University of Michigan M.Q.E.M. 
 
Independents: Arthur D. Little; Bostian Research Associates; Business Economics, Inc.; Cahners 
Publishing Co.; Charles Reeder; Clearview Economics; Econoclast; Econoviews International, 
Inc.; Eggert Economic Enterprises; Evans, Carrol and Associates; Classicalprinciples.com; 
Kellner Economic Advisors; MMS International; Moody’s Capital Markets; Morris Cohen & 
Associates; Naroff Economic Advisors; Peter L. Bernstein, Inc.; Polyconomics; SOM 
Economics, Inc.; Standard & Poors; Stotler Economics, Inc.; Turning Points (Micrometrics); 
Wayne Hummer & Co.; Pema Associates; Action Economics; Moody’seconomy.com; 
Economist Intelligence Unit 
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Appendix II: Granger Causality Measures of Herding 
 
 As additional evidence of herding, Granger Causality tests were used to prove that the 
lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast, implying that the current 
period forecast does not cause the lagged consensus.  To complete this analysis, three veterans 
were randomly selected from the GNP dataset and the unemployment dataset.  All six of these 
forecasters provided evidence that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period 
individual forecast.   
According to Granger Causality (Granger, 1969), variable x Granger-cause variable y if: !!! = !!!!!                                                 (1: Restricted)         
    !!! = !!!!! + !!!!!                                       (2: Unrestricted) 
F(2) > F(1), indicating that the lagged value of variable x provides additional explanatory power 
to the current period value of y, and if: !!! = !!!!!                                                 (3: Restricted)         
    !!! = !!!!! + !!!!!                                       (4: Unrestricted) 
F(3) = F(4), indicating that the lagged value of variable y does not provides additional 
explanatory power to the current period value of x.   In the context of the current analysis, 
variable y is an individual forecaster’s forecast, and variable x is the consensus forecast. 
1.  GNP Data 
 The three forecasters selected from the GNP dataset were Chase Manhattan, Conference 
Board, and Chrysler.  For Chase Manhattan, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the 
current period individual forecast, F(1, 189) = 34.82, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed 
that the lagged individual forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 189) = 0.22, 
p = 0.6394, revealing that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual 
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forecast. For Conference Board, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current 
period individual forecast, F(1, 282) = 8.16, p = 0.0046, and the second F-test revealed that the 
lagged individual forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 282) = 0.16, p = 
0.6894, revealing that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual 
forecast. For Chrysler, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period 
individual forecast, F(1, 281) = 22.17, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged 
individual forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 281) = 2.31, p = 0.1299, 
revealing that the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast. 
2.  Unemployment Data 
 The three forecasters selected from the GNP dataset were University of Maryland 
Inforum, Northern Trust Company, and Turning Points (Micrometrics).  For University of 
Maryland Inforum, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period individual 
forecast, F(1, 256) = 59.18, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged individual 
forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 256) = 1.54, p = 0.2158, revealing that 
the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast. For Northern Trust 
Company, the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period individual forecast, 
F(1, 269) = 7.56, p = 0.0064, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged individual forecast 
does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 269) = 2.33, p = 0.1279, revealing that the 
lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast. For Turning Points 
(Micrometrics), the first F-test that the lagged consensus causes the current period individual 
forecast, F(1, 220) = 30.00, p < 0.0001, and the second F-test revealed that the lagged individual 
forecast does not cause the current period consensus, F(1, 220) = 0.86, p = 0.3556, revealing that 
the lagged consensus Granger-causes the current period individual forecast.  
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Appendix III: Estimation Procedure Rationale 
 
When estimating equations (4) and (5) using panel data, I had to choose to either use a 
fixed effects regression or a random effects regression.  Theoretically, fixed effects estimation is 
more appropriate to the current analysis due to individual variations between the forecasters that 
could be accounted for in the individually estimated intercept terms for each forecaster.  
However, if fixed effects are not necessary to account for this variance, random effects 
estimation is more efficient than fixed effects.  To determine the appropriate estimation 
procedure, I completed Hausman Tests comparing the estimates of the random effects and fixed 
effects estimations of each specification.  The Hausman Test compares the coefficient estimates 
and variances of the coefficients of the fixed effects and random effects regressions: (!!" − !!")! (!!" − !!") 
where !!" and !!" are the coefficient estimate and variance using fixed effects, respectively and !!" and !!" are coefficient estimate using random effects, respectively.  The differences of the 
estimates of the estimates are then compared on a !! distribution: 
• !!: Coefficient estimates are consistent between fixed effects and random effects, but 
only random effects is efficient 
• !!: Coefficient estimates are not consistent between fixed effects and random effects, 
only fixed effects is accurate 
The results of the Hausman Tests are presented in Table X29.  All but one of the Hausman Test !! statistics are significant, providing grounds for rejecting !! in favor of !! and using fixed 
effects estimation.  However, after a closer look, it is clear that the estimates between fixed 
                                                
29 Note: For brevity, Table X only includes Hausman Test results for the models that correct for first order serial 
correlation.  Additional Hausman Tests were conducted for the determined orders of serial correlation for each 
subsample and yielded similar results. 
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effects and random effects are not considerably different.  In fact, the average actual difference 
between the fixed effect and random effect estimates for all the regressions is .019975.  It is 
likely that although there are not considerable differences between these estimates, the Hausman 
Test statistic was inflated by the sample size of each estimate.  Consequently, on further review, 
I chose to use random effects estimation to maximize the efficiency of the models.   
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Figures and Tables 
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Figure 1: Individual value function derived from Prospect Theory 
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Figure 2: Forecaster’s perspective during consistent growth 
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Figure 3: Forecaster’s perspective after macroeconomic shock 
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Figure 4a: Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds 
 
Figure 4b: Flowchart of The Theory of the Transitory Wisdom of Crowds 
Time
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 of
 C
on
se
ns
us
 Fo
re
ca
st
He
rd
ing
 (W
eig
ht
 on
 La
gg
ed
 C
on
se
ns
us
)
t = 2t = 0 t = 1
 
-Maximum Intragroup 
Diversity 
-Maximum Consensus 
Accuracy 
  
-Decreased Intragroup 
Diversity 
-Decreased Consensus 
Accuracy 
 
Begin Herding 
 
Slowing Herding 
Deviating 
t = 3 t = 1 
t = 2 
-Minimum Intragroup 
Diversity 
-Minimum Consensus 
Diversity 
 
Freedman 69 
Figure 5: Number of forecasters in subsample (veterans) and total sample. 
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Figure 6: Actual GNP/GDP growth vs. forecasting error across time, veterans and entire sample 
 
Figure 7: Actual unemployment vs. forecasting error across time, veterans and entire sample 
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Figure 8: Dispersion of veterans’ forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in June  
 
Figure 9: Dispersion of veterans’ forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in December  
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Figure 10: Dispersion of all forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in June  
 
Figure 11: Dispersion of all forecasts of GNP/GDP growth in December 
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Table I: Summary of predictions of Mud on Your Face Theory (1) and the Theory of the 
Transitory Wisdom of Crowds (2).  First 2 rows in each box provide the conditions (Accuracy of 
individual and consensus); last 2 rows provide the predictions of individual herding behavior 
provided by each theory. 
Individual: Accurate Individual: Accurate 
Consensus: Accurate Consensus: Inaccurate 
Predictions: Predictions: 
1: Herd 1: Herd 
2: Herd 2: Deviate 
Individual: Inaccurate Individual: Inaccurate 
Consensus: Accurate Consensus: Inaccurate 
Predictions: Predictions: 
1: Deviate 1: Deviate 
2: Herd 2: Deviate 
 
 
 
Table II: Composition of affiliations of forecasters in subsample (veterans) and total sample 
across entire sample. 
# of Forecasters % # of Forecasters % 
Industrial Organization 4 16% 19 17%
Bank 7 15% 29 14%
Securities Firm 2 5% 26 14%
Econometric Forecaster 5 14% 8 5%
Independent Forecasters 7 22% 31 21%
Total 25 100% 120 100%
Veterans Total Sample
Industry Affiliation of Forecasters in Dataset
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Table III: Overview of regression results for all estimations of equation (5).                                                                                               
 
Variable
Entire 
Sam
ple
Entire Sam
ple 
C
orrected
Veterans
Veterans 
C
orrected
Entire 
Sam
ple
Entire Sam
ple 
C
orrected
Veterans
Veterans 
C
orrected
Lagged Individual Forecast
.7901**
0.3448**
0.6407**
.4116**
.7174**
.3659**
.7082**
.5252**
Lagged C
onsensus Forecast
.2502**
.6671**
0.4168**
.6447**
.2789**
.6083**
.2923**
.4745**
R
ecent Individual Squared Error
0.0002
.0729**
0.0206
.0661*
-0.0034
0.0039
-0.1302
-0.04
R
ecent C
onsensus Squared Error
.2351**
 -.0531*
0.2197**
-0.0228
 -.9197**
0.5303**
-0.0763
 -.1964*
Lagged Individual A
ccuracy X
 Lagged C
onsensus
-0.002
 -.0253**
-0.0084
 -.0210**
0.0003
-0.0018
0.0161
0.0054
Lagged C
onsensus A
ccuracy X
 Lagged C
onsensus
 -0.0755**
0.0143
 -0.0736**
0.0047
.1447**
 -.0863**
0.0117
.0339*
O
bservations
13281
2179
5988
1550
12831
3192
5934
4209
Forecasters
115
108
25
25
113
108
25
25
R
2 O
verall
0.9449
0.9875
0.9456
0.9858
0.9842
0.9955
0.9836
0.9892
W
ald C
hi Squared
225913.6
171944.84
104052.09
107104.53
796392.7
708382.39
356231.54
384674.54
Lags
1
1,3,6,9,10
1
1,3,6,8,9
1
1,2,3,4,6,9
1
1,2,4
N
otes:
1.  D
ependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rG
N
P
2.  C
oefficient estim
ates reflect average across sam
ple across tim
e using random
 effects regression
3.  Z-statistics (under coefficient estim
ates): * significant at 5%
, ** significant at 1%
4.  Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (R
eported in last row
)
5.  Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
O
verview
 of R
esults, R
andom
 Effects, Equation (5)
rG
N
P/rG
D
P
U
nem
ploym
ent
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Table IV: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5), 
correcting for first-degree serial correlation. 
 
Specification
Sample Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast 0.7873 0.6413 0.7901 0.6407
149.35** 63.51** 150.21** 64.18**
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.2208 0.374 0.2502 0.4168
40.39** 35.59** 41.13** 36.38**
Recent Individual Squared Error 0.0002 0.0206
0.02 0.86
Recent Consensus Squared Error 0.2351 0.2197
13.31** 6.75**
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.002 -0.0084
-0.56 -0.94
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0755 -0.0736
 -11.48**  -6.07**
Constant 0.0046 -0.0153 -0.1053 -0.145
0.8 -1.78  -10.58**  -9.59**
Observations 13788 6214 13281 5988
Individuals 115 25 115 25
R2 Overall 0.9569 0.9575 0.9449 0.9456
Wald Chi Squared 306025.36** 140050.24** 225913.56** 104052.09**
Lags 1 1 1 1
Notes:
1.  Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2.  Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3.  Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4.  Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5.  Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
rGNP/GDP Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Correcting for First Degree Serial Correlation
(4) (5)
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Table V: Regression results for unemployment data using estimation equations (4) and (5), 
correcting for first-degree serial correlation. 
 
Specification
Sample Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast 0.712 0.7074 0.7174 0.7082
123.73** 79.97** 126.16** 79.66**
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.2925 0.2947 0.2789 0.2923
49.80** 32.70** 46.19** 31.59**
Recent Individual Squared Error -0.0034 -0.1302
-0.05 -1.2
Recent Consensus Squared Error -0.9197 -0.0763
 -5.69** -0.77
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0003 0.0161
0.03 0.92
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.1447 0.0117
5.64** 0.68
Constant -0.0336 -0.023 0.0143 -0.0107
-4.95  -2.37* 1.34 -0.75
Observations 12831 5934 12831 5934
Individuals 113 25 113 25
R2 Overall 0.9841 0.9836 0.9842 0.9836
Wald Chi Squared 746187.37 356170.03** 796392.67** 356231.54**
Lags 1 1 1 1
Notes:
1.  Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2.  Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3.  Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4.  Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5.  Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
Unemployment Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Correcting for First Degree Serial Correlation
(4) (5)
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Table VI: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5), using 
serial correlation corrections determined from entire sample. 
 
Specification
Sample Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast 0.8645 0.5146 0.3448 0.3772
65.90** 21.30** 19.92** 12.95**
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.1427 0.576 0.6671 0.6938
19.05** 26.79** 39.13** 23.96**
Recent Individual Squared Error 0.0729 0.0611
5.44** 2.33*
Recent Consensus Squared Error -0.0531 -0.0252
 -2.1* -0.67
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0253 -0.0176
 -5.48** -1.86
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0143 -0.0021
1.6 -0.16
Constant -0.0270 -0.0560 -0.0280 -0.0245
 -3.55** -5.69  -2.13* -1.36
Observations 5839 2703 2179 1025
Individuals 112 25 108 25
R2 Overall 0.9749 0.9812 0.9875 0.9907
Wald Chi Squared 226608.20** 141059.26** 171944.84** 107490.07**
Lags 1,2,3,7 1,2,3,7 1,3,6,9,10 1,3,6,9,10
Notes:
1.  Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2.  Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3.  Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4.  Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5.  Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
rGNP/GDP Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections 
Determined from Entire Sample
(4) (5)
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Table VII: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5), using 
serial correlation corrections determined from veterans subsample. 
 
Specification
Sample Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast 0.8106 0.4585 0.8712 0.4116
50.04** 16.23** 66.67** 15.91**
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.0676 0.6151 0.0886 0.6447
8.59** 23.57** 10.54** 25.14**
Recent Individual Squared Error -0.0133 0.0660
-0.087 2.52*
Recent Consensus Squared Error 0.0336 -0.0228
1.11 -0.61
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0051 -0.0210
0.96  -2.21*
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0079 0.0047
-0.74 0.35
Constant 0.0042 -0.0141 -0.0556 -0.0958
0.45 -1.39  -3.54**  -5.34**
Observations 3406 1590 3313 1550
Individuals 110 25 109 25
R2 Overall 0.9802 0.9890 0.9726 0.9858
Wald Chi Squared 22700.3** 141707.68** 117338.99** 107104.53**
Lags 1,2,3,6,8,9 1,2,3,6,8,9 1,3,6,8,9 1,3,6,8,9
Notes:
1.  Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2.  Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3.  Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4.  Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5.  Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
rGNP/GDP Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections 
Determined from Veterans Subsample
(4) (5)
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Table VIII: Regression results for unemployment data using estimation equations (4) and (5), 
using serial correlation corrections determined from entire sample. 
 
Specification
Sample Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast 0.4588 0.3953 0.3657 0.2483
30.45** 16.82** 24.03** 12.02**
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.5624 0.6162 0.6087 0.7023
38.05** 26.1** 41.38** 30.87**
Recent Individual Squared Error 0.0044 -0.0547
0.06 -0.52
Recent Consensus Squared Error 0.5246 -0.0919
3.11** -0.89
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0019 0.0114
-0.18 0.67
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0852 0.0124
 -3.17** 0.69
Constant 0.0483 0.0319 0.0199 0.0412
6.78** 3.02** 1.71 2.75**
Observations 3285 1549 3191 1500
Individuals 108 25 108 25
R2 Overall 0.9956 0.9955 0.9955 0.9953
Wald Chi Squared 737725.92** 338178.73** 708450.83** 313605.92**
Lags 1,4,7,9 1,4,7,9 1,2,3,4,6,9 1,2,3,4,6,9
Notes:
1.  Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2.  Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3.  Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4.  Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5.  Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
Unemployment Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections 
Determined from Entire Sample
(4) (5)
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Table IX: Regression results for GNP/GDP data using estimation equations (4) and (5), using 
serial correlation corrections determined from veterans subsample. 
 
Specification
Sample Entire Sample Veterans Entire Sample Veterans
Variable
Lagged Individual Forecast 0.6163 0.5264 0.6112 0.5252
60.60** 33.98** 60.13** 33.87**
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.4096 0.4759 0.3996 0.4745
51.16** 35.68** 48.67** 35.01**
Recent Individual Squared Error 0.1090 -0.0400
1.63 -0.39
Recent Consensus Squared Error -1.1629 -0.1964
 -7.5**  -2.08*
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0156 0.0054
-1.58 0.33
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.1852 0.0339
7.53** 2.06*
Constant -0.0247 -0.0349 0.0315  -0.0184*
 -3.87**  -3.68** 3.03** -1.36
Observations 9012 4209 9012 4209
Individuals 111 25 111 25
R2 Overall 0.9894 0.9892 0.9895 0.9892
Wald Chi Squared 844571.02** 384620.15** 849775.41** 384674.54**
Lags 1,2,4 1,2,4 1,2,4 1,2,4
Notes:
1.  Dependent variable is the individual current period forecast of rGNP
2.  Coefficient estimates reflect average across sample across time using random effects regression
3.  Z-statistics (under coefficient estimates): * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
4.  Lagged values of the dependent variable included to correct for serial correlation (Reported in last row)
5.  Italicized = unexpected, Bold = unexpected and significant
Unemployment Results, Random Effects GLS, Equations (4) and (5), Using Serial Correlation Corrections 
Determined from Veterans Subsample
(4) (5)
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Table X: Hausman Test Results 
Baseline Specification (4) Full Specification (5)
Veterans rGNP
Lagged Individual Forecast -0.0121 -0.0114
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.0121 0.0110
Recent Individual Squared Error -0.0197
Recent Consensus Squared Error 0.0198
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.008
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0082
Number of Observations 6214 5988
Chi Squared (Hausman) 21.72** 22.85**
Entire Sample rGNP
Lagged Individual Forecast -0.0076 -0.0082
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.0070 0.0072
Recent Individual Squared Error 0.0031
Recent Consensus Squared Error -0.0024
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0002
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0012
Number of Observations 13788 13281
Chi Squared (Hausman) 17.02** 36.65**
Veterans Unemployment
Lagged Individual Forecast -0.0047 -0.0049
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.0046 0.0042
Recent Individual Squared Error -0.0732
Recent Consensus Squared Error -0.0192
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0110
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0000
Number of Observations 5934 5934
Chi Squared (Hausman) 6.4* 9.23
Entire Sample Unemployment
Lagged Individual Forecast -0.0098 -0.0134
Lagged Consensus Forecast 0.0103 0.0146
Recent Individual Squared Error -0.0798
Recent Consensus Squared Error 0.2076
Recent Individual Squared Error X Lagged Consensus 0.0124
Recent Consensus Squared Error X Lagged Consensus -0.0309
Number of Observations 12831 12831
Chi Squared (Hausman) 37.62** 69.53**
Notes:
1.  Chi-Squared: * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%
Actual Difference in Coefficient Estimates Between FE and RE
Hausman Test Results
  
